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GENDER INTEGRATION INTO THE MILITARY: 
A META-ANALYSIS OF NORWAY, CANADA, ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
Abstract 
Over the past 15 years, the Global War on Terrorism has necessitated an examination of 
the military’s practices and the way that they meet the complexities of new and different types of 
war and tactics. Vital to this examination are policies related to the inclusion and deployment of 
women in combat. Burba stated war is not a setting for social testing, but the American Military 
must embrace the social subtleties of gender differences in an effort to meet the Armed Services 
requirement for an ever-changing asymmetrical battlefield. 
This study compares and contrasts the American current policy divergent to three other 
countries’ policies that have successfully integrated women into combat: Norway, Canada, and 
Israel. Through this examination, an opportunity to recognize gaps in training and procedural 
information that are most important to the successful implementation in the United States is 
revealed. 
The scientific data, although supporting the fact that physiological differences exist 
between men and women, were not supported in the argument that all women should be 
excluded from combat units. In all case studies, it was found that women who volunteered for 
combat assignments performed equally as well as their male counterparts without degradation of 
operational readiness or a lower unity of cohesion. 
However, I was not surprised that the leaders of the three counties observed that the 
successful integration of women into combat units is not about changing a culture. It is simply a 
leadership issue. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 15 years, the Global War on Terrorism has necessitated an examination of 
the American Military’s practices and the way that they meet the complexities of new and 
different types of war and tactics. Vital to this examination are policies related to the inclusion 
and deployment of women in combat. Burba (2007) stated that war is not a setting for social 
testing, but the American Military must embrace the social subtleties of gender differences in an 
effort to meet the American Armed Services requirement for an ever-changing asymmetrical 
battlefield along with the specific skills required of its entire population to match future 
technological advances in weaponry and tactics. 
In January of 2013, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD; 2013b) announced that by 
January 2016, all jobs would be open to women, including Special Operations units such as U.S. 
Army Rangers and U.S. Special Forces (Vanden, 2013). This action rescinds the long standing 
exclusionary policy that is not only institutionally transforming, but also challenges practices, 
beliefs, and attitudes about women in combat that have developed over many years—238 years 
to be exact. 
From a historic perspective, the U.S. Congress passed the Women’s Armed Services 
Integration Act of 1948 (McSally, 2007) with its Ground Combat Exclusion Policy that dictated 
how many women could be in one branch of service, which jobs they could hold, and the 
military rank they could achieve (McSally, 2007). During that time, and into the 1960s and 
1970s, having women in combat roles was virtually unthinkable; however, when reviewing this 
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law, the historical context in which it was written cannot be dismissed. Examining the historic 
precedent brings to light the social evolution that has occurred in the American Military. 
Since the American Revolutionary War, fighting American wars has been officially 
legalized as a “males only” occupation with laws and policy established to reflect and maintain 
that exclusiveness. However, women have always served in combat, even if unofficially and not 
formally recognized by the U.S. Congress. During the last 50 years, significant social, cultural, 
and technological changes have occurred that influence how we view the nature of war and how 
we prepare and deploy the military. A prime example of how the military views combat enemies 
occurred during the September 11, 2001, attacks. Prior to those attacks, wars were fought on a 
linear battlefield; there were distinct enemy and friendly lines. September 11, 2001, changed that 
structure to an asymmetrical battlefield where the enemy can be located adjacent to or in the 
same battle zone of the American Armed Forces.  
 
  
Figure 1. Linear (symmetrical) and nonlinear (asymmetrical) battlefields. From U.S. Army, FM 3-90 
Technological advances in weaponry and the diminished desire of men to serve in the 
military coupled with the evolution of the societal roles of women emerge as pivotal components 
driving the need for change. Today, women comprise about 14 percent of the active force and 
roughly 17 percent of the Reserve Components (Burrelli, 2013) compared to 1.4 percent in 1960 
        Linear (symmetrical battlefield                                Nonlinear (asymmetrical 
battlefield) 
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and slowly increasing to 11.4 percent in 1990 (Rutgers Institute for Women’s Leadership, 2010). 
In recent decades, changes in both law and policy have altered women’s roles in the larger 
society and the military jobs they are allowed to perform. According to the Alliance for National 
Defense (AND; 2013), “Evolutionary rather than revolutionary, several of the most dramatic 
changes occurred following the first Gulf War with the repeal of both the ban on women serving 
aboard combat aircraft and combat ships” (n.p.). Policy changes followed these legislative 
actions. 
Problem Statement 
The criticisms leveled at the DoD’s definition of direct ground combat are that it is not 
relevant and makes no sense when describing the asymmetric battlefield of today. The terms 
“well forward on the battlefield,” “forward line of own troops,” and “forward edge of the 
battlefield” imply a linear array of military forces that were envisioned during the 20th Century 
Cold War. Today’s modern conflicts in the Middle East and other hot spots around the world are 
fought asymmetrically, meaning that the line of battle is not well defined. In short, the wars 
waged in Iraq and Afghanistan bear no resemblance to the physical circumstances that led to this 
definition. The complexities of today’s operational environment in combat have changed; 
accordingly, the roles of women in combat have also changed. 
Rescinding the Combat Exclusion Policy (DoD, 1994) for women in the American 
military service presents opportunities and challenges that require a comprehensive systematic 
integration plan to secure success in the short and long term. An institutional change that 
challenges core beliefs and current practices, such as this one, demands committed leadership at 
all levels demonstrating, over time, through their words, actions, and decisions, that they 
embrace new roles for women in the U.S. Army, and hold themselves and others accountable. 
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Absent a consistent implementation, resistance, and inertia will stall and ultimately compromise 
leader’s ability to drive change. According to Bolman and Deal (2008), organizations embark on 
deep change when faced with major problems or opportunities; here the American military has a 
great opportunity. Those senior leaders charged to respond to this directive are hindered by 
conflicting current policy. They are charged to manage the change at their level and implement 
women into their combat units as combat power. However, current policy concerning integration 
of women into combat units has not caught up to the termination of the Combat Exclusion Policy 
(DoD,1994), for women are authorized to engage the enemy, on the ground with small arms 
weapons, but not allowed in these units that historically conducts such operations. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is the examination and presentation of successful gender 
integration policies through a cross-case analysis of three other developed countries. The 
findings indicate that, whether or not the gender standards are normed to conform to less 
physically strong women or neutrally aligned across the genders, unit morale and cohesion (i.e., 
unit effectiveness) are not degraded by integration of the sexes. Moreover, the very small 
percentage of women who volunteer for combat assignments perform equally as well as do men. 
The progress of integration shows that, for the plan to succeed, it must be a leadership issue, 
rather than a social or cultural issue. 
The significance of this study is its importance in revisiting the assumptions held by 
many political advisors, policy makers, and stakeholders about the challenges and opportunities 
arising from women formally joining combat units. By examining other countries’ policies of 
gender integration a cross-cultural perspective provides insight into how American military 
women might fully function in combat arms units. The second purpose of the study is to 
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document various strategies and develop a disciplined initiative for American military leaders to 
facilitate a successful transition from a longstanding political directive opposed to women in 
combat toward a more progressive position that will meet the evolving needs of the American 
Armed Forces. It is anticipated that this exploration will lead to an accurate depiction of the 
American military woman’s environment and improve leadership knowledge of the critical gaps 
in the current knowledge base about the new generation of women that limit the understanding 
about how they can optimally function in their military environment. 
Research Questions 
In this study, I compare and contrast the current American policy that is divergent from 
three other countries’ policies that have successfully integrated women into combat: Norway, 
Canada, and Israel. Through this examination, I reveal an opportunity to recognize gaps in 
training and procedural information that are most important to the successful implementation in 
the United States. In addition, the research uncovers indicators for a successful model through 
the assessment of the factors in the American policy that currently stands and the factors that 
possibly were eliminated or totally overlooked. Four questions guide the cross-case policy 
analysis and should be addressed well before the American Military begins implementation. The 
long-term questions might take between 5–10 years to answer. They are discussed in the 
conclusion of the study. 
Research Questions 
1. What are the current organizational conditions that restrict women’s advancement in 
the American Military? 
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2. How does the American gender integration policy compare and contrast with the 
gender integration policies of the three other developed countries of Norway, Canada, 
and Israel? 
3. What are the gaps in training and procedural information that are most important to 
the successful implementation in the United States? 
4. What are the beliefs and assumptions held by political advisors, policy makers, and 
stakeholders about the challenges and opportunities arising from women formally 
joining combat units? 
Assumptions 
The current structure of the American Military is inequitable to women, especially when 
it pertains to promotion, advancement, and operational experience. In my personal experience, I 
hear many general comments from senior leaders state, “Our system has worked for 238 years, 
why are we changing it now,” and few state, “It’s about time women are given the same 
opportunity serve as men.” The combat arms’ leaders will question this policy change, but the 
idea that only courageous, brave, tough men can defeat the Nation’s enemies will no longer be a 
valid assumption. When a woman can lead a brigade into battle as an “infantrywoman,” the long-
held image of combat as “men only” will give way to women as equals in all military roles. 
Societal Opinion 
Military and civilian advocates for full gender integration argue that women can compete 
alongside men in the workforce, in athletics, and on the battlefield (Simons, 2001). However, the 
debate over gender equality continues in every corner of the work environment in the United 
States, especially among those people who remain virtually single-gender (Ms. Foundation for 
Women, 2013). Similarly the struggle for women’s parity in American society and in the role of 
 7 
 
 
women in the American Military continues. The irony of the debate in military settings is that 
modern warfare has already placed women in direct ground combat engagements with the enemy 
over the past 2 decades and particularly over the past 15 years in postwar Iraq and in 
Afghanistan, in spite of the DoD (1994) policy that excludes women from ground combat. 
Policymakers from the Revolutionary War to the present have attempted to exclude women from 
combat; however, an examination of the historical sources shows that women have stood side by 
side with their male counterparts in every major conflict that the United States has fought 
(Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 2008). 
The contributions of women to readiness and effectiveness in ground combat units are 
clearly documented in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. In fact, Putko (2008) concluded, “There is 
not the slightest doubt that women can perform their assigned duties in the combat zone, 
including engaging in combat actions essential to their personal and unit’s self-defense, with skill 
and valor equal to their male comrades” (p. vii). 
In the past, the DoD referred to a public survey on the lack of public support for 
assigning women to combat jobs (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 1998). This 
might have been true; however, since the 1990 the Gulf War and more recently, the public 
clearly supports expanding the role of women in combat. Gallup surveys of public opinion have 
produced data that tell the story. In 1991, 52 percent of people surveyed responded they were in 
favor of women serving in combat roles (Brown, 2013). In 2001, the Gallup Organization polled 
the public regarding women serving in combat jobs; again, 52 percent were in favor of women 
serving in these jobs (Brown, 2013). When asked 7 years later in a September 2007 Gallup poll, 
the numbers jumped to 74 percent. Finally, in January 2013, the public opinion rose to 84 
percent in favor and 6 percent with no opinion; more than eight in 10 Americans believe that 
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women should either (a) have the opportunity to serve or (b) be required to serve the same 
combat assignments as men serve. Public opinion has clearly changed over the last few decades 
in favor of women performing combat operations. However, in addition to the DoD arguments 
against assigning women to combat roles, some scholars and military historians have come 
forward to offer their theories about how women will perform in combat. 
Countries Providing Insight for Gender Integration Policy 
In this study, I compare and contrast the current American policy against three other 
countries’ policies that have already integrated: Norway, Canada, and Israel. Through this 
examination, I take an opportunity to recognize gaps in training, and will reveal procedural 
information that is most important to the successful implementation in the United States. In 
addition, I assess the factors in American policy that should be eliminated or totally overlooked 
regarding indicators for a successful model. I now present a brief introduction of the three 
countries that are examined in this meta-analysis. 
Norway 
The Norwegian women contributed greatly to their country’s military during WWII; 
however, despite the contributions and positive experiences from both the Officers Training 
School and the Army Communication School, the Norwegian Parliament debated and decided in 
1953 that women could no longer serve in the Norwegian Military (Steder, 2014, as cited in 
Vaernø & Sveri, 1990). In 1976, the Norwegian Parliament reconsidered its decision and decided 
to allow women into noncombat positions. The first women to enter officer training occurred in 
1977 in the Norwegian Air Force; however, the heated debate over women serving in combat 
positions continued until 1984. The Norwegian Parliament introduced the Military Occupational 
Equality [policy] of 1984 (Steder, 2014) for men and women, which allowed men and women to 
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have the same opportunity on a volunteer basis to enter any organization in the Norwegian 
Military. Thus, Norway was the first North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country to take 
on this decision; thus, it became a pioneer country for women in the military. 
Canada 
The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is right on a par with the American Military 
employing 17 percent of all military personnel as women compared to 16 percent for the United 
States. However, unlike the United States, Canada supports the roles of women in all positions 
within its military, including small combat units. As discussed previously, most policies of 
integrating women were developed in response to political pressure, and Canada was no 
exception. The Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC; 2013) Tribunal directed in 1989 
that women must be fully integrated into all Canadian Force roles except service on submarines. 
The Minister’s Advisory Board on CAF Gender Integration and Employment Equity removed 
the 2001 restriction; the advisory board had been up to transform beliefs about women’s 
integration by the “adoption of not only a policy, but also a belief in the need for a respectful 
workplace” (Cawkill, Rogers, Knight, & Spear, 2009, p. 17). 
Israel 
The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the Israeli Ministry of Defense’s 1995 policy of not 
allowing women into the Israeli Air Force pilot’s course was solely founded on gender and, 
therefore, constituted unlawful discrimination (Finestone et al., 2014). This decision initiated 
radical changes in the combat active service opportunities for women in the Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF). Today, women serve in combat roles in many IDF units, including the light 
infantry brigade, artillery, and Border Police. 
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Conclusion 
As women’s roles continue to develop, expand, and cultivate a place in the American 
Military, women will experience unique challenges. They will also likely struggle to permeate 
interpersonal activities informed by traditional norms inherent to the culture of the military. 
The combat branches of each service have a boastful history of courage and audacity in 
battle. The amount of intense training required is enormous and inflicts stress on the body and 
mind. Some leaders have long considered women to lack the physical or mental capacity to 
handle the stresses of the training and the actual combat. Although some women warriors accept 
formal exclusion from battle, the current policy limits women’s access to advancement alongside 
their male counterparts. 
A large portion of the research that I have included elucidates the previous contributions 
that women have made, and the societal and cultural opinions about them, and challenges the 
scientific, theoretical, and physiological issues and perspectives that have originated from a 
historically all-male organization. Historical narratives relay the accomplishments that women 
have proven in battle, the change in enemy tactics, the current ideology about today’s modern 
battlefield, and how counterinsurgency operations require the best that all American Military 
service members have to offer. 
Senior leaders are responsible for this transition and a successful integration will demand 
a critical mass of support from leaders at every level. As it is outlined, this change will be 
implemented in phases and evaluated after each stage is completed. The U.S. Marine Corps has 
completed this initial phase and four women have tested in the infantry course. In 2013, the U.S. 
Marine Corps graduated its first female marines from their rigorous and challenging infantry 
course and lauded them as an absolute success. The next stage will be evaluated to determine 
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how these four women will do in combat units, if they are assigned to such units. The magnitude 
of the change is enormous because the U.S. Army, as of October 2014, issued its timeline to 
incorporate women into the elite U.S. Army Ranger School. On April 20, 2015, 19 women 
started Ranger Class 06-15. Eight women successfully completed the Ranger Assessment 
Program week; however, all were recycled into the next Ranger Class 07-15 for failing to meet 
specific patrolling standards and given a second attempt at patrolling. After the second attempt, 
five women were dropped from the course and three women were given a day-one recycle into 
Ranger Class 08-15, that started on June 21, 2015. These three women successfully met the 
standards of the Benning Phase and moved on to the Mountain Phase on July 10. All three 
women passed the knot test, military mountaineering skills assessment, the foot movement up 
Mount Yonah, and were given opportunities to lead patrols—one woman recycled into Ranger 
Class 09-15 to start the Mountain Phase. Two women received a passing grade in the mountains 
during platoon-level combat patrols, and moved on to the Swamp Phase. The two women also 
met the standards of the Swamp Phase, proficiently leading waterborne platoon-level combat 
patrols, and became the first women ever to earn the Ranger Tab. They graduated August 21, 
2015. 
When leaders of organizations choose to oppose a cultural shift, they might believe that 
their opposition is founded on logical thought and sound judgment; however, when others fail to 
support their initiatives, they assume that the others are not thinking rationally or are somewhat 
out of touch with the objectives. In a study about change and resistance patterns, Conner (1992) 
posed the question, “Why the double standard? The answer may lie in the circumstance that 
whenever the challenges confronted differ significantly from the capabilities we possess, we are 
threatened” (p. 126). Some leaders in the American military might not realize that they have the 
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capability to accept a policy change such as formally assigning women to combat roles; they 
might perceive that a lack of resources or rationale exists to accommodate the change. Therefore, 
the resistance to this change might not be the change itself, but it might be the implications to the 
change, or the “perceived” implications.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of the literature review is to provide a historical examination of women in 
combat, to review both sides of the argument, and to recommend approaches for American 
military leaders to transition from the old culture of gendered roles into the new culture of 
women in combat as formal members of combat units. 
Pryce, Pryce, and Shackelford (2012) illuminated unique aspects of the wars in 
Afghanistan and previously in Iraq. One section of the book details general information about 
“women warriors” (p. 88). Pryce et al. outlined the circumstances that led the American Military 
to give women an expanded role in combat, which included the increased need for volunteers 
because of the lack of male volunteers and cultural restrictions for warfare in Muslim countries 
that prohibited any U.S. Army men from performing necessary aspects of routine duty such as 
physically inspecting Muslim women. These culturally driven additional duty requirements 
obligated servicewomen to perform those essential responsibilities. 
The operational environment of modern military warfare with advanced weaponry and 
the reality of armed conflict with new enemy tactics and counterinsurgency operations will 
require the best soldiers, airmen, sailors, marines, and leaders—men and women. With an 
emerging, new kind of enemy, it has been established that the Global War on Terror will be a 
protracted and costly fight (Record, 2003). The American Military will be called upon 
consistently to protect its self-interests, its borders, and the citizens of the United States. 
In January 2013, the DoD (as cited in Lopez & Henning, 2013) announced that, by 
January 2016, all jobs will be open to women, including Special Operations Units such as the 
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U.S. Army Rangers and the U.S. Special Forces (Vanden, 2013). The American Military is on 
the brink of a historical change and, in 2016, men (and women) will have to adopt and adapt to 
this policy change. Through this literature review, I provide multiple perspectives regarding the 
integration of women, which might allow American Military leaders a different lens through 
which to view the transition to allowing women to serve in combat units. In addition to the 
historical perspective, the present day wars in Afghanistan and postwar Iraq offer an 
unprecedented opportunity to examine the performance of women during combat operations. 
Overview of Women in Combat 
Women have served with honor and distinction as far back as the Revolutionary War in 
1776. De Pauw (1981) stated that at least a few hundred women fought in the American 
Revolutionary War. De Pauw also discussed evidence of women’s participation in artillery units. 
According to De Pauw, approximately 400 women frequently carried the water used to swab out 
canons and many often passed themselves off as men to serve in the American Civil War. 
During World War II, the U.S. Army’s chief of staff, General George C. Marshall 
secretly conducted an experiment without informing Congress. General Marshall heard that the 
British used women in mixed battery antiaircraft combat duty against the German Army 
(Parham, 2006). General Marshall used women in the same capacity and stunned the general 
staff by showing that the units mixed with men and women in equal proportion performed better 
than all-male units performed and had higher unit cohesion. 
Heroic stories recount women’s performance in combat in the past decade under stressful 
situations while receiving enemy fire. When reading the citation of U.S. Army Sergeant Leigh 
Ann Hester’s award, one can fully appreciate what a certain percentage of women can bring 
potential to the U.S. Army. Sergeant Hester was first woman since World War II to be awarded 
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the Silver Star medal for valor in combat. The citation stated, “She skillfully led her team of 
[Military Police] Soldiers in a counterattack after about fifty insurgents ambushed a supply 
convoy they were guarding” (Hall of Valor, 2013). Another combat veteran, U.S. Marine Corps 
Lance Corporal Carrie Blais, shot and killed an insurgent during a firefight in Haditha, Iraq. 
Fraley (2011, as cited in Wise, 2006) provided other exemplary acts of bravery of women in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, stating, 
Private First Class Teresa Broadwell Grace, an M249 gunner, was awarded the Bronze 
Star with V for Valor for actions during an October 2003 firefight in Karbala, Iraq. After 
her unit was ambushed, Grace’s High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (Humvee) 
drove into the kill zone and “her commanders estimate that Grace and her comrades 
killed more than twenty Iraqis during the encounter.” (p. 22) 
Sexual Harassment 
Combat is more stressful than other assigned missions are for both genders. During 
combat operations and extended deployments, all soldiers become physically fatigued, often only 
getting 4–6 hours of sleep. They are also physical fatigued because of the fear of death and the 
unknown every time they go on a mission. The inherent missions conducted in a garrison, or “at 
home” environment can be mitigated with safety measures and supervision—when beginning a 
mission, the unknown of whether one will talk to one’s loved one again in the next 16 hours is an 
enormous stress. Women are more likely to experience the added stressor of sexual harassment 
(Chaumba & Bride, 2010; Lipari, Cook, Rock, & Matos, 2008; Street, Vogt, & Dutra, 2009) and 
other interpersonal stressors related to being a women in a male-dominated setting (Miller, 2000; 
Rona et al., 2007; Vogt et al., 2005; Weatherhill et al., 2011). However, women also face sexual 
harassment and assault in noncombat roles; and, with the anticipated, limited number of women 
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who will take advantage of entering combat units, a noticeable spike might not exist in the 
amount of sexual assault and harassment cases. 
This research makes the ongoing investigation of the current factors unique to women’s 
service experiences even more vital, especially when the formerly all-segregated combat MOS 
will now be integrated in 2016. As research will indicate, it is important to explore all factors, 
strengths, and challenges within the American Military context to eliminate harassment and other 
interpersonal stressors. 
Vealey (2014) discusses a 2000 investigation conducted by Laura Miller concerning 
gender harassment in the military using a qualitative design by which U.S. Army men and 
women were observed and interviewed from 1992–1994 to examine their hostility toward 
military women. Miller reported that resistance from the men came from their perceptions that 
women did not have to perform at the same standard as men. Miller (2000) specified a number of 
stereotypes that were held by the men about military women: 
1. that the physical training standards were easier for women; 
2. that women should not be allowed to participate in the military because of inherent 
physical weaknesses; 
3. that military women took advantage of pregnancy; 
4. that women were allowed more time to improve their education; and 
5. that women were assigned less difficult and less labor-intensive duties than military 
men were assigned. (p. 24) 
Dutra et al. (2010) conducted on a sample of active duty women soldiers in the U.S. 
Army who presented for routine post deployment screenings as part of a larger, longitudinal 
study of women’s deployment stress and health outcomes (Dutra et al., 2010). In this quantitative 
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pilot study, Dutra et al. examined combat exposure experiences and military sexual harassment 
to assess the impact of these stressors on self-reported post deployment PTSD and depression 
symptoms among 54 active duty U.S. Army women. Approximately 75 percent of the sample 
recognized combat exposure, more than 50 percent recognized sexual harassment, and one-third 
endorsed symptoms of PTSD that resulted more from military sexual trauma than from combat 
exposure (Vealy, 2014). However, data were collected shortly upon return from their deployment 
and might not reflect the long-term impact of deployment. 
The U.S. Department of Justice (2013) documented five statistics in its National Crime 
Victim’s Right’s Week Resource Guide: 
1. In 2010, victims Ages 12 or older experienced a total 188,380 (20 percent) rapes or 
sexual assaults. 
2. Of the victims, 92 percent were female. 
3. Of the victims, 25 percent were assaulted by a stranger, 48 percent were assaulted by 
a friend or acquaintance, and 17 percent were assaulted by an intimate partner. 
4. Of the victims, 35 percent reported the assault to law enforcement. 
5. The total reports of sexual assault in the American Military were 3,158 (15 percent). 
(p. 30) 
According to DoD (2013a), 3,374 incidents of sexual assault were reported, which was 
16 percent—a 1 percent increase—and below the national average. The DoD’s information 
supports the supposition that females of all ages are victimized in and out of the American 
Military. The American military is a microcosm of American society; therefore, it follows that 
the treatment of women in the American Military would be similar to the treatment of women in 
America generally. 
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Although sexual assaults in the military are pervasive, mirroring those in the population 
as a whole, women’s secondary status has historically made them vulnerable, and their growing 
empowerment works to undercut assumptions of a masculine superiority. In a military culture 
with an explicit hierarchy, many more men have power over women, which can cultivate an 
atmosphere in which power is abused. Although problems with sexual assault and harassment 
have a potential to increase with integration, allowing men and women to serve with each other 
as equals will likely build respect and trust as women prove that they are as capable as men are. 
Military leaders have stated that sexual assault and harassment violate core professional values 
and culture, and have developed a package to confront the problem head-on (U.S. Department of 
the Army, 2014). Although military and governmental leaders strive to address pervasive sexual 
assault within the military, other factors have influenced the development of the integration of 
women into the American Military. 
Historic and Current Policy 
Women have always participated in the Nation’s wars, in official or unofficial capacity 
and, over several decades, these roles and the jobs of women have changed. Consequently, a 
major emphasis in this study concerns leaders’ beliefs about their roles in changing the culture to 
support the integration and the changing roles of women in all the services, for in these studies, 
war is always the catalyst. 
During the colonial era, women followed men onto the battlefield, assisted in logistical 
support, and perhaps even fought, but the historical records of these encounters are thin. 
Nevertheless, better documentation and evidence now exists of their contributions from the 
American Revolutionary War. Catherine Greene’s letters, written during the winter of 1777–
1778, while quartered with her husband, General Nathaniel Green, tell of several stories of life in 
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the American Continental Army and the wives who participated in the American Revolution War 
(Campbell, 2010, as cited in Bradford, 2010). Each American Continental Army unit was 
allowed a certain percentage of wives to help with various tasks around camp, but they were not 
following their husbands to fight the enemy (Bradford, 2010). 
General George Washington often complained about his logistical challenges and he 
found solace in this endeavor when he realized that women were essential for completing chores 
such as sewing, cooking, cleaning, and even boosting morale. Washington even considered these 
women official members of the American Continental Army and gave them half rations in return 
for their services. 
A minority of women gained notoriety when they stepped forward and conducted combat 
operations. One such famous woman is Margaret Corbin, who was detailed to bring water to the 
cannons and keep them cool while firing. While commanding an artillery unit at Fort 
Washington, her husband died in action and Margaret took his spot, and was wounded; years 
later, she became the first woman to receive a pension. 
Another courageous woman who performed a similar feat at Monmouth in 1778 was 
Mary Ludwig Hays, known to many as “Molly Pitcher.” William “John” Hays enlisted as a 
gunner in the American Continental Army. It was common at the time during the American 
Revolutionary War for wives to be near their husbands in battle and to help as needed; Mary 
followed Gunner Hays back to New Jersey during the war’s Philadelphia Campaign (1777–
1778). John Hays fought in the Battle of Monmouth in Freehold, New Jersey, on June 28, 1778, 
which was consequently a brutally hot day. Mary was present as well, and she made countless 
trips to a nearby spring to fill pitchers of cold water for soldiers to drink and to pour over their 
cannons to cool them down for which tireless efforts the soldiers nicknamed her “Molly Pitcher.” 
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According to accounts, Mary witnessed her husband collapse at his cannon, unable to continue 
with the fight. Mary immediately dropped her water pitcher and took his place at the cannon, 
operating the weapon throughout the remainder of the battle until the colonists achieved victory. 
Another category of women in combat was women who dressed as men to enter Army 
units and fight for their country. Such an example was Deborah Sampson who enlisted as Robert 
Shurtleff and later identified as a woman once wounded. Along with the others who “cross-
dressed,” she ultimately was found out and routinely sent home; none ever received a pension or 
compensation for any injuries because of their “unwomanly” actions or for service to their 
country (Bradford, 2010). 
The American Civil War was the epicenter of American military historiography that 
documented the roles of women in the military. Bradford (2010) said that, according to 
historians, more than 250 women were cross-dressers and, as in the American Revolutionary 
War, they were released once they were discovered. Nevertheless, more than 400 women 
actually served in the Civil War. Schultz (2004) estimated that 20,000 women worked in 
hospitals, both on the sides of the North and South. Leonard (1994; as cited in Bradford, 2010) 
described the service of Mary Walker, the only woman doctor in the Union Army; Sophronia 
Bucklin, a battlefield nurse; and Annie Wittenmyer, who organized medical supplies and 
kitchens for wounded soldiers. Regardless of the contributions of women during the American 
Civil War, nursing became systematized and doctors became professionalized. Some women, 
such as Dorothy Dix, who served as superintendent of nurses in the Union Army, were in charge 
of entire hospitals and even wore the rank of officers (Bradford, 2010). 
The War with Spain in 1898 was the Nation’s first overseas war, and it demonstrated a 
need for a permanent staff of professional nurses that could expand in wartime as needed. This 
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need ultimately created the U.S. Army Nurses Corps in 1901. By the early part of the 20th 
century, women were officially serving in the military; gone were the days of women 
seamstresses and cooks. 
At the conclusion of World War I, women were again released from the service and not 
allowed to serve again until World War II because of “manpower” shortages. On May 15, 1942, 
the U.S. Congress enacted legislation accepting women volunteers into the Women’s Auxiliary 
Army Corps for noncombat service. On July 30, 1942, Congress authorized the formation of the 
Women’s Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Services. Although “Auxiliary” was dropped from 
the title within the U.S. Army unit, both groups were officially reserve organizations. In addition, 
the shortage of male pilots led to the formation of the Women’s Auxiliary Ferry Squadron on 
September 10, 1942. These women pilots, under the command of Nancy Love, were to deliver 
aircraft from the factories to the battlefield and training areas, and only 5 days later, the 
Women’s Flying Training Detachment was formed. By this point, the need for not only women, 
but also competent, strong women was easily discernible among senior civilian leadership within 
the services. At the war’s end, many stateside military leaders advocated the deactivation of 
women’s units, but on June 12, 1948, the U.S. Congress passed the Women’s Armed Services 
Integration Act, granting permanent military status to women (Bradford, 2010). 
In 1973, the U.S. Army opened all Reserve Officer Training Corps programs to women, 
and in 1976, authorized their entry into the U.S. Military Academy (West Point); and then the 
question became, “What jobs should they be trained to do?” (Bradford, 2010, p. 874). The U.S. 
Coast Guard had the most flexibility because, in wartime, it fell under the U.S. Navy and was not 
subject to the combat exclusion clause. The other services struggled with the issues of women 
serving in combat, and with the defeat of the ERA amendment, the fear of a woman draft and 
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subsequent service on the front lines loomed. By the 1990s, America witnessed over 40,000 
women serving in the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War and had a better understanding of how 
the lines between combat and combat support could not easily be distinguished or completely 
drawn. These historical examples indicate that sometimes women were recognized as full 
members of the military and gained full compensation, while other times they were denied 
access and opportunity. For example, women began training to be U.S. Army helicopter pilots in 
1974; yet, until just recently, they were denied the opportunity to fly combat missions. The U.S. 
Armed Forces fundamentally define themselves as war fighters; therefore, being excluded from 
directly fighting a war casts women as “other,” that is, unable to meet the definition. 
The DoD (2013) rescinded the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule of 
1994, known as the “Risk Rule” and as the Combat Exclusion Policy (DoD, 1994) for women, 
that had included a matrix assessing the threat of combat exposure on a linear battlefield (GAO, 
1998). This matrix assigned a “P” level of hazards on the battlefield with a P1 being the highest 
and P7 being the lowest. The policy stated that females could not serve in units with a rating of 
P4 or lower. The then new Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta followed this action, directing the 
U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps to study opening more specialties and assignments to women, 
and to submit their expansion plans for his approval. The outcome of this action effectively 
opened tens of thousands of previously closed military positions to the assignment of women. 
Therefore, since 1994, the DoD (as cited in AND, 2013) has defined direct ground combat as 
engaging the enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being 
exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile 
force’s personnel. [It] takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and 
closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect. (n.p.) 
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The presence of women in the military has raised controversy throughout the different 
phases of this integration. A panel of active duty women and veterans testified before the 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC, 2010) that was developed in 2009 to 
evaluate the Combat Exclusion Policy (DoD, 1994) and to determine whether it should be 
reversed. During the 2010 exchange, retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Frank 
Petersen, in a 2011 National Public Radio interview expressed his concerns about getting rid of 
the ban. Peterson stated, 
Here is my problem; we’re talking about ground combat, nose-to-nose with the bad guys, 
living in the mud, eating what’s on your back, no hygiene and no TV. How many of you 
have seen how infantrymen, the ground troopers, live, and how many of you would 
volunteer to live like that? 
The U.S. Department of the Army (2013) initiated a deliberate service-wide effort to be 
certain that performance could be applied and understood in combat, and termed it Soldier 2020. 
This concept is designed to ensure that U.S. Army organizations are employed with the best-
qualified soldiers. This effort includes opening previously closed positions and MOS to females, 
while maintaining overall combat effectiveness (Cone, 2013). Today, female soldiers occupy 
crucial combat support roles in combat arms battalions around the world and recent wartime 
experience has proven that few practical limits exist to the vital contributions that women make 
in combat operations. 
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) currently leads two efforts 
within Soldier 2020. Effort 1 is to study the physical demands required for each military 
occupational specialty; Effort 2 is to examine extensively the institutional and cultural factors 
associated with integrating women into combat units. In collaboration with the U.S. Army 
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Medical Command’s U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, TRADOC’s first 
effort has identified critical physically demanding MOS specific tasks. Applying scientific rigor 
and methodology, the U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine is using 
laboratory equipment to measure soldiers’ mental and physical capacities while they carry out 
these tasks. These measurements are designed to determine the physiological capabilities (e.g., 
strength, endurance, and energy) that an individual must have to complete specific tasks to 
acceptable standards. These measurements will also help the U.S. Army to establish clear, 
updated standards across the force (Haviland, 2013). TRADOC’s Effort 2 employs focus groups, 
interviews, surveys, soldier feedback, an ongoing literature review, and collaboration with 
numerous outside agencies to study current policies and processes that will provide potential 
implementation strategies and possible barriers to success that might be driven by culture and 
tradition. 
Early in November 2014, the U.S. Army’s Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade that is 
stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, selected 31 female soldiers to serve as observers and advisers 
for a potential U.S. Ranger Course Assessment that began in the spring of 2016. The women 
assisted the U.S. Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade cadre in observing all major blocks of 
instruction and training during this assessment, but not in serving as ranger instructors or in 
training and evaluating female U.S. Ranger students, but only in assisting the current male cadre. 
The observers and advisers included 11 officers and 20 noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs). Beginning in November 7, 2014, the female soldiers were involved in weekly training 
events to prepare them to understand the mental and physical demands placed on U.S. Ranger 
students. According to Major General Scott Miller (as cited in Department of the Army Public 
Affairs, 2014), the commanding General of the Maneuver Center of Excellence stated, 
 25 
 
 
I was very satisfied with both the quality and quantity of the volunteers we received, their 
performance and professionalism over the course of the week was extraordinary. This 
group did very well for what was a very physically challenging week for any Soldier.” 
(n.p.) 
The U.S. Army will decide later in 2016 whether to assess the U.S. Ranger Course. If the 
decision is made to continue allowing females in the U.S. Ranger Course, the assessment of the 
course will include both female and male soldiers, as well as female soldiers to serve as 
observers and advisers to the cadre who conduct the course. 
The Secretary of Defense announced in January 2013 (DoD, 2013b) that, by January 
2016, all combat arms jobs in the military would be open to women. This new policy will 
challenge the values and beliefs within an organization and a culture that has existed for over 238 
years. To ensure that leaders have strategies and approaches to integrate women into combat 
roles, I describe how the changing societal opinions have reversed since 1991, revealing a 
noticeable acceptance of women in combat and how women have served courageously in combat 
in the past 20 years. 
During the past 15 years, the duties that women have taken on and the roles they have 
played in the military have changed. More than 200,000 women have served in the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and many of them have found themselves in direct ground combat situations, 
despite a Pentagon policy opposing that from occurring. 
Conclusion 
For integration of women in the American Military to succeed, leaders at every level 
must support the historic transition that affects both men and women in the American Military. 
Conner (1992) explained, “Change is often perceived as a perplexing jungle that many people, 
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organizations, and even whole societies enter only to become entangled in the undergrowth of 
confusion and dysfunction” (p. ixx). A generational shift is occurring and no time is better than 
now to implement this policy. If not now, when? A new group of leaders has entered the 
American Military in the past decade and is currently composed of senior officers and NCOs in 
the ranks. They are more technologically advanced, more “liberal” in their acceptance of others, 
and more likely to respond positively to this change than have been previous generations. 
Senior leaders are responsible for integrating women into combat roles and it will 
demand a critical mass of support from soldiers at every level. Small steps are underway, and the 
integration of women into previously “male only” roles is being piloted within the American 
Military. The U.S. Marine Corps recently graduated its first women from their rigorous and 
challenging infantry course, and this accomplishment was lauded as an absolute success. The 
next stage of their development within combat units will be evaluated to determine how these 
four women will do, if they are assigned to such units. Although the magnitude of the change 
toward full integration of genders is enormous, the assumption of resistance to change in the 
“normal” order of our society has been challenged. 
All leaders will execute this transition, fulfilling the requirements of their roles. Although 
some leaders might embrace it and the promise that it holds, other leaders might not genuinely 
support it, but they will attempt to make this transition a smooth one. Any given organizational 
culture can be strong or weak, the difference is in deciding to put away old ways of thinking and 
to embrace new changes with an open mind. Schein (1984) attributed the strength of an 
organizational culture to two factors: (a) the consistency and stability of group membership, and 
(b) the duration and intensity of group, shared experiences. It might take some time for this 
consistency to take shape; however, the intensity and group experiences have already occurred 
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during the past 15 years in Afghanistan and postwar Iraq. Women have attained more respect 
than ever before for their contributions in fighting two wars alongside their male counterparts. 
They have proven that their capacity to handle the physical and mental rigors of war are equal to 
men, and have done so while graciously being place “second” to men in the military. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents a meta-analysis methodology used to examine information derived 
from on-line and national governmental sources used to explore the standards, policies, and 
composition of women in the Norwegian, Canadian, and Israeli Militaries compared to American 
Military. These accounts are used to analyze valid arguments for and against the integration of 
women into the American Military combat teams as compared to the successes and challenges of 
other foreign militaries who have already initiated the integration. A qualitative meta-analysis 
study, in particular an argumentative and interactive policy analysis style, is used because 
combining these two styles will provide the reader arguments that might bridge the gap between 
two opposing sides of the dispute and enrich understanding of opposing viewpoints. In the 
chapter, I present a description of the policy analysis method, and an overview of how the policy 
analysis will unfold. 
Policy Analysis Style 
Policy analysis is a multifaceted arena in which lie several activities used to support 
policy and policy processes. Mayer, Daalen, and Bots (2004) identified six major clusters of 
activities as a model for analyzing policy; however, the list is not all-inclusive and more 
activities were conducted, which make the research not only richer and more comprehensive, but 
also more complex. 
1. Research and analyze. 
2. Clarify arguments and values. 
3. Democratize. 
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4. Mediate. 
5. Provide strategic advice. 
6. Design and recommend. 
 
Figure 2. Criteria of policy analysis. From “Perspectives on policy analyses: a framework for understanding 
and design” by I. Mayer, C. Daalen, and P. Bots, 2004, International Journal of Technology, Policy and 
Management, 4(2), p. 11. Copyright 2004 by Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. Adapted with permission. 
Depending on the specific policy analysis design, one, two, or more clusters might be 
involved and might prevail over the others, while the remaining might become subordinate or 
irrelevant. The activities are designed in a logical way as related to one another: the further the 
activities are from each other, the greater the field of tension that exists and the more difficult 
unification becomes. This does not imply that the activities are discordant; they are yet 
connected, as the illustration suggests; however, it simply means that the tension must be 
resolved. 
In the policy analysis styles linked to activities model in Figure 2, one can observe the six 
activities on each point of the hexagon with the six, policy analysis styles: the argumentative 
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style, the participatory style, the interactive style, the process style, the client advice style, and 
the rationale style. For this policy analysis, I used the argumentative and interactive styles for 
their relevance and alignment with the problem. These two approaches are impelling archetypes. 
The argumentative style assumes that policy is made, defended, and criticized through the 
medium of language (Mayer et al., 2004). When analyzing policy using the argumentative style 
it is important to listen carefully to the semantic game that surrounds the policy problem or the 
issue. The attention of the issue will shift to a debate and, within the debate, rhetoric, arguments, 
untruths, and facts that are not based on any type of scientific or academic review will be 
injected. The ambition of this type of policy analysis is to inject recommendations and 
improvements on the policy to the parties that have been cross-talking for years and to bridge the 
gap between opponents. 
This research site and scope addresses the policy of integrating women into combat units; 
therefore, the second style I chose is the interactive style. According to Mayer et al. (2004), the 
interactive style assumes that individuals—experts, analysts, clients, 
stakeholders and target groups—have or may have differing views of the “same” policy 
problem. An insight relevant to policy can be obtained by bringing about a confrontation 
and interaction of different views. The interactive style has a strong socio-constructive 
foundation. Different views of reality can be valid simultaneously. Through continuous 
interaction and interpretation—the “hermeneutic circle”—it is possible to gain an insight. 
(p. 14) 
With the interactive style, specific groups such as stakeholders, policy makers, target 
groups, and academic and medical advisors are brought in to develop solutions to current issues, 
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which brings about multiple interaction by which the participants learn about their own views in 
relation to others, have the opportunity to refine those views, and, therefore, become enriched. 
Using the policy analysis framework—and specifically paying attention to the 
argumentative and interactive styles—I show that three of the four countries explored have 
already gained knowledge from over a decade of integration. I also show that they learned from 
previous experiences what worked and what did not work, debated at their respective 
Department of Defense levels and amended policy to meet the requirements of the changing 
environment, and influenced how the policy is executed at the lowest levels of command and 
supervisory management. 
Two types of policy action or activities abridge the argumentative approach to policy 
analysis, making the policy easier to understand by making judgments according to justifications 
for the policy, logic, and richness of the data used, scientific or otherwise. The two abridged 
actions in this case are (a) research and analyzing and (b) clarifying values and arguments. Both 
the policy actions and the argumentative style are object-oriented in that policy is ultimately 
captured in a written policy, model, or product. Remembering that researching and analyzing 
policy occur at department levels, questions asked before making policy (a) are consistent and 
relevant to the issue at hand; (b) are about facts, causes, and effects; and, therefore, (c) call for 
scientific research. Action regarding clarifying values and arguments is also done at department 
levels and is on the other side of the argumentative style. This action is founded on questions that 
are derived from ethics, society, and opinions of public policy that occur when prolonged 
conflicts and social issues occur regarding fundamental and normative argumentative 
differences. Using this type of action will not only produce instrumental recommendations for 
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policy making, but also will also allow researchers to analyze the system that reinforces the 
political debate. 
The interactive style of policy analysis used in the three countries that are explored, and 
is abridged by the mediate and democratize actions of policy analysis. The interactive style, 
coupled with the two actions, is subject-oriented in that it is focused on the stakeholder level as 
in the policy of integration, and represents the troops, leaders, and supervisors on the ground; 
therefore, it is captured in the quality of the policy itself. The interactive style assumes that the 
stakeholders have different views or opinions about the same issue. Therefore, insights are 
gleaned from the target groups through structured meetings, interviews, and interactions. This 
brings about multiple insights whereby the policy analysis is enriched and more informative to 
the political debate at the object-oriented level (research and analyze, and clarify values and 
arguments). Using interactive style is informative to the processors and planners, and is more 
likely to lead to an acceptance that will bring about positive effects to the users or, in this 
instance, the stakeholders. 
Using these two styles of policy analysis—argumentative and interactive—when 
exploring the three countries’ policies, will allow a more thorough understanding of the findings 
when comparing the successes of the countries’ studied to the struggles that the American 
Military might have when integrating in 2016. The three countries researched have integrated 
women for over 2 decades; therefore, I have used the two styles of policy analysis that allow a 
rich analysis of the questions that must be answered for the successful integration of the 
American Military: 
1. How do the current standards for entry into direct ground combat units compare with 
what is actually required to perform the mission of a direct ground combatant? 
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2. What jobs did women perform in Iraq and currently perform in Afghanistan that are 
physically and mentally different from what would have performed had they served in 
a direct combat unit? 
3. How do the gender-neutral standards compare, if changed, with the previous (male) 
standards and how do the new standards affect military performance in direct ground 
combat units? 
4. Does integration affect unit morale and cohesion in direct ground combat units and, if 
so, how? 
5. Have the sexual harassment and assault claims lessened, remained the same, or rose 
since integration? 
First, I conducted a policy analysis, comparing and contrasting the current American 
policy against policies of the countries’ that have already integrated. Through this examination, I 
was able to recognize gaps in training, medical, and procedural information that are most 
important to the successful implementation in the United States. In addition, I performed an 
assessment of the factors in American policy that the policy eliminated or totally overlooked, 
regarding indicators for a successful model. 
Second, I examined the countries that allow women in combat units and the standards at 
which they compete for assignments. When comparing standards, only physical standards were 
evaluated and whether the selected countries used gender-neutral standards in training. I 
considered the Military Need Factor, which is the total number of conflicts and was derived from 
the Correlates of War. An exploration of how much a military was used over the period from 
1948 to 2016 provides a decent snapshot of operational readiness, rapid response time, and 
military need. Although the Correlates of War do not directly give an assessment, they do 
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present each conflict’s start and end dates. If a nation’s military was used in two conflicts 
simultaneously, it will be double-counted to capture the stress that this puts on a military’s 
personnel. 
Lastly, I have performed an examination of the population and prescribed ratio of women 
to men in the entire military and those who choose combat arms. When comparing the other 
three militaries against that of the United States, the American Military is the busiest and the 
biggest; therefore, a ratio is particularly important when calculating the numbers. 
Selection of Cases 
The three countries, Norway, Canada, and Israel, were chosen because of the amount of 
time that women have been integrated into their combat arms branches, the types of missions that 
have been performed currently and in the past, and the organizational structure of their militaries 
compared to the American Military. Prior to choosing these countries, I did not have any 
knowledge of the success or failure rates, if any, of their integration of women into their 
militaries so that I would not specifically select a high success rate with full integration. 
Norway was the first NATO country to implement fully an equality policy in its military 
in 1984; and the CAF opened all military occupations to women in 1989, with the exception of 
submarine service, which opened in 2000. Throughout the 1990s, the introduction of women into 
the combat arms increased the potential recruiting pool by about 100 percent. Women in the 
Israeli Defense Force were on full combat duty as far back as 1948, during the War of 
Independence; however, their participation then ceased immediately upon the end of the war. It 
was not until the 1990s that Israeli women were allowed to become combat pilots. In 2000, an 
Equality Amendment to the Defense Service Law allowed women to serve in any role in the 
military and gave them equal rights with men. 
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Women already serve in close combat specialties in the following countries: Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Spain, and Sweden (Haring, 2013). Perhaps best known for its use of women 
in the military is the IDF in which women comprise 34 percent of the force and are conscripted 
along with their male peers. The IDF restricts the service of women to 88 percent of available 
positions; however, women do serve in close combat positions in the Caracal Combat Regiment 
and in the Border Patrol. To narrow the focus of this research, I arranged to compare Israeli, 
Canadian, and Norwegian Militaries with the American Military as it pertains to integrating 
women into combat units. 
In the IDF, women are excluded from some units because of religious considerations 
necessitated by Orthodox Jewish law. In a 2005 study of female combatants, Israeli commanders 
reported that women “exhibit superior skills” in 
 Discipline and motivation. 
 Maintaining alertness. 
 Shooting. 
 Managing tasks and organization. 
 Displaying knowledge and professionalism in weapons use. (Cawkill et al., 2009) 
The Norwegian military, which does not receive much notoriety concerning their 
integration policy, has employed women in all ground combat specialties, and in all units, since 
the early 1980s. They were the first NATO country to allow full integration by allowing women 
to serve on submarines and all other functions since 1985 (Nielson, 2001). The Norwegians also 
report that women increase operational effectiveness and, thus far, no evidence exists that unit 
cohesion has been affected by having women in combat units. Similarly, according to the CAF, 
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which has also been fully integrated since the 1980s, reported that no negative effect exists on 
operational performance or team cohesion because of the presence of women in combat units. 
The scope of this analysis includes the previously mentioned foreign countries’ 
developed standards, policies, and composition when integrating women into combat arms units 
and specialties. The study is limited to exploring (a) the design and implementation process used, 
(b) societal objections and approvals, (c) challenges, and (d) successes or failures of the 
transition. This study does not evaluate or provide conjecture on the decision to integrate women 
into combat arms units, nor does it provide insights from a political perspective. 
I assumed that, although the decision to transition women from supporting roles to 
combat roles in the U.S. Army might cause controversy, every male senior leader in the U.S. 
Army would execute the change. Many U.S. Army leaders might not agree with the 
transformation, but they will support the directives to integrate women within their units. I focus 
on “the best business rules” provided by other militaries that have already taken on this venture 
and forged ahead when other countries looked on in disdain, and provide emphases on how to 
facilitate integration by gaining stakeholder support so that integration can be accomplished with 
minimal adverse impact. 
Norway 
The Norwegian Military has created a well-functioning organization based on diversity, 
total equality, and efficiency in leadership skills. Women have the same rights as men to all 
positions, both military and civilian, in the Norwegian Armed Forces; however, it is yet a largely 
all-male dominated military with only 14 percent of its service members consisting of women. 
Today, Norway, is led by an arduous front-line of women, including Prime Minister Erna 
Solberg and her mostly female cabinet, which includes Defense Minister Ine Eriksen, who is 
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leading the charge to an inclusive, cohesive, unisex defense force. Norway wants its armed 
services to become as progressive and gender-blind as the top echelons of government 
(Campbell, 2014). Norway has even further integrated the sexes by adopting same-sex living 
arrangements in some units, which has raised international scrutiny. However, this has occurred 
for several years in the Norwegian Armed Forces and, for the service members, this is old news. 
On June 14, 2013, Norway’s Defence Ministry proposed amending the Conscription Act, 
Law No. 29 of July17, 1953, about military service and the Home Guard Act, Law No. 28 of 
July 17, 1953. The law extended full conscription to all citizens, including women, beginning 
January 2015. The conscription for women applies to women born on January 1, 1997, or later, 
and the law will conscript women from Age 19. It also proposes minor changes to the rules on 
military law and National Guard law because of developments in the military and society. 
Canada 
Canada is very progressive regarding the ratio of women in its military, and the areas or 
jobs in which they can serve, and is considered by many countries to be at the forefront military 
gender integration. Women in the CAF can enroll in any occupation, which includes combat 
arms branches, and serve in any operational environment. In every military job or specialty, men 
and women are selected for training, promotions, postings, and all career opportunities in exactly 
the same way; their service is based on rank, qualifications, and merit. 
Statistics. As of January 2014, the percentage of women in the CAF, Regular Force, and 
Reserve combined was at 14.8 percent, with more than 9,400 women in the Regular Force and 
more than 800 women in the Reserve (Women in the CAF, 2014). 
 The Royal Canadian Air Force comprises the highest percentage of women at 18.7 
percent. 
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 Similarly, the Royal Canadian Navy has a representation of women of 18.4 percent. 
 The Canadian Army is represented by women at 12.4 percent. 
Initiatives. With diversity in the workplace becoming an increasingly important 
objective, gender issues are receiving heightened visibility in the CAF. Initiatives are currently 
being implemented that will increase the parity for women in the military by eliminating 
discriminatory practices and attitudes, rather than by granting special privileges and status. 
Recruiting and retention. The Canadian Defense Department intends to approve an 
active recruiting campaign, showing women in all roles with the intent to attract more women 
into the forces, particularly in the combat arms branches. They are actively recruiting women for 
challenging career opportunities featuring excellent training and rewarding pays and benefits. 
The CAF Recruiting Group regularly conducts outreach activities with women’s professional 
associations, educators, and students to increase their awareness of these career opportunities. 
Defense Advisory Group. The CAF supports the operation of Defense Employment 
Equity Advisory Groups for each of the four groups designated by the Employment Equity Act 
of 2014 (Backgrounder, 2014), including the Defense Women’s Advisory Organization. The 
objective of the Defense Advisory Groups is to consult with designated group members, provide 
advice and insight to the leadership on issues relevant to their membership and implementation 
of employment equity. 
According to the Government of Canada (2014) as cited in Women in the CAF, 2014), 
the Defense Advisory Groups 
are looked upon to assist management with the employment equity action plans, provide 
direction to resource outlets, harmonize relations with the four identified designated 
group members, escalate retention rates, and provide evolutional, viable teams, and 
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productive working environmental situations. These groups are mandated to discuss 
evolving employment equity policies, encourage new strategies regarding recruitment 
and retention, and support facilitation of positive work environments (np.). 
Diversity training and education. All members of the CAF must clearly understand the 
rules of employment equity and diversity, and how they can benefit the organization. All 
personnel receive awareness training and information sessions throughout their career and have 
direct contact through their chain of command to the latest information on the subject of 
employment equity and diversity. Basic Diversity Training is given to both officers and 
noncommissioned members during their respective basic course and more advanced training is 
provided when they reach their advanced leadership educational courses. The curriculum 
includes sessions in personal conduct policies such as harassment prevention and resolution, 
personal conduct and relationships, sexual misconduct, and sexual harassment. 
Israel 
Military service is obligatory for both men and women in Israel. Women constitute 
approximately a third of the conscripts and nearly 20 percent of the standing professional army. 
Of all army positions, 92 percent are open to women, including the elite units in the Artillery 
Corps—including the “Sky Riders” who operate unmanned aerial vehicles—and combat roles in 
the Israeli Navy, Air Force, Home Front Command, and Military Police in the West Bank. In 
addition to the Caracal Battalion, in August 2015, the Israeli Defense Force completed recruiting 
for the new mixed-gender, light-infantry battalion “Lions of the Jordan”—another border patrol 
unit that is stationed along the eastern border of the Jordan Rift Valley. 
Women in combat roles serve in the same manner as their male counterparts, although 
women in the Israeli Military normally serve only 2 years. The length of service for men was 
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reduced in July 2015 from 3 years to 32 months, and an initiative is underway to lengthen the 
women’s draft from 24 months to 28 months to cover the shortfall and reduce the gap between 
men and women’s service time. Following field testing in early 2015, Israel decided not to allow 
women to serve in tank units. However, after reviewing the policies of other Western militaries, 
Israel did leave room to reconsider that decision and to allow women to serve as combat 
engineers who would operate heavy equipment in enemy territory (Sudilovsky, 2015). 
Analysis 
A fundamental adherence to traditional values exists in the American Military, and 
perhaps, most importantly, the policies are driven by organizational or institutional factors. By 
observing the political and organizational achievements of Norway, Canada, and Israel, the 
American Military can view its own unique challenges and be a true learning organization. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
The approach taken in studying the integration of women into combat units, as a model 
for the United States, is to evaluate and assess how other countries developed plans, policies, 
standards, and procedures for military services that have previously been integrated. Studying 
foreign militaries provides a social, cultural, and historical context for observing the dispute 
regarding whether women should be fully integrated in American Military combat units. 
Integration Policies of the United States and other Foreign Countries 
In 2009, the Ministry of Defense in the United Kingdom commissioned a very in-depth 
study and produced an exceedingly worthy analysis for the arguments that oppose women in 
small combat units and those that support the practice. Military representatives from 27 countries 
were contacted to obtain information relating to their policies, practice, and experience of 
integrating women into combat roles. Although 27 countries provided information, all 27 
countries, including the United States, held the same concerns. For this study, only three foreign 
countries were analyzed: Norway, Canada, and Israel in order of their individual integration 
dates. A myriad of justifications existed for those countries that do not yet include women in 
small combat units; however, in the beginning of integration, the countries that allowed gender 
integration had the same concerns. In fact, the two primary reasons for not allowing gender 
integration revolved around physiological (physical standards) and psychological (unit cohesion) 
factors. 
The Ministry of Defense found that many countries do allow women to serve in small 
combat arms units, with the Nordic countries being particularly progressive. However, the three 
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countries that still maintain a combat exclusion policy are the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia. As with the United States, inclusion policies have been imposed on the 
Nation’s military because of political and legal pressures (Cawkill et al., 2009). For the countries 
that did rescind their individual exclusion policies, only a very small number of women actually 
volunteered for the position. Every country is about even on percentages at around 15 percent 
with the exception of Norway, which is at around 3 percent (Cawkill et al., 2009). The 
percentages are low because of the high physical demands and aggressiveness of men who taunt 
the women not to join. Where combat roles are open to women, many are simply not attracted to 
the close, ground combat elements of the job. 
 
Figure 3. Countries that allow women in combat. From “Map: Which countries allow women in front-line roles?” 
by M. Fisher, 2013, The Washington Post, Worldviews. Adapted with permission. 
United States 
In January 2013, the DoD (as cited in Lopez & Henning, 2013) announced that by 
January 2016, all jobs would be open to women, including Special Operations units such as U.S. 
Army Rangers and U.S. Special Forces (Vanden, 2013). The U.S. Army is on the brink of a 
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historical change and, in 2016, men (and women) must adopt and adapt to this policy change. 
Researchers provide multiple perspectives regarding the integration of women into combat units 
and present concerns along with risk mitigation that leaders have instituted from other countries, 
allowing them to navigate the transition of allowing women to serve in combat units. In addition 
to the historical perspective, the present day war in Afghanistan and previous war in Iraq offer an 
unprecedented opportunity to examine the performance of women during combat operations. 
The U.S. Congress passed the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act (1948) with its 
Ground Combat Exclusion Policy that dictated the number of women who could be in one 
branch of service, which jobs they could hold, and the military rank they could achieve 
(McSally, 2007). During that time, and into the 1960s and 1970s, the idea of having women in 
combat roles was virtually unthinkable; however, when reviewing this law, the historical context 
in which it was written cannot be dismissed. Examining the historic precedent brings to light the 
social evolution that has occurred in the American Military. 
The DoD (2013) rescinded the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule of 
1994, known as the “Risk Rule” and as the Combat Exclusion Policy (DoD, 1994) for women, 
which had included a matrix assessing the threat of combat exposure on a linear battlefield 
(GAO, 1998). The rescinding was due to the experiences women faced during the Gulf War in 
1990.  This matrix assigned a “P” level of hazards on the battlefield with a P1 indicating the 
highest level and P7 indicating the lowest level. The policy stated that women could not serve in 
units with a rating of P4 or lower. The then new Secretary of Defense Panetta followed this 
action, directing the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps to study the feasibility of opening more 
specialties and assignments to women and of submitting their expansion plans for his approval. 
The outcome of this action effectively opened tens of thousands of previously closed military 
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positions to the assignment of women. In addition, the DoD (1994, as cited in AND, 2013) has 
defined direct ground combat as 
engaging the enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being 
exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile 
force’s personnel. [It] takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and 
closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect. (n.p.) 
After the elimination of the Combat Exclusion Policy (DoD, 1994), General Martin 
Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the DoD would be pursuing all 
avenues to provide the most opportunities for women to help provide greater upward mobility 
(Scott, 2013). To comply with the chairman’s intent, the U.S. Army presented the topic of 
women in combat positions in the U.S. Army’s 2013 Posture Statement. The U.S. Army Vision 
(HQDA, 2009) stated that, the American Military was to be “globally responsive and providing 
full range of capabilities is no longer about gender or race. It is about professionalism and 
leadership” (n.p.). The U.S. Department of the Army’s (U.S. Senate, 2013) 2013 Posture 
Statement said: 
The Army is committed to ensuring that female Soldiers are provided career 
opportunities that enable them to reach their highest potential while enhancing overall 
Army Readiness. Over the last year, the Army opened more than 13,000 positions to 
women. In January 2013, the DoD rescinded the Direct Ground Combat Definition and 
Assignment Rule, thus enabling the elimination of unnecessary gender-based restrictions 
for assignment. The Army is currently developing, reviewing and validating occupational 
standards, with the aim of fully integrating women into occupational fields to the 
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maximum extent possible. We are proceeding in a deliberate, measured and responsible 
way that preserves unit readiness, cohesion and morale. (p. 7) 
Senior leaders have been responsible for this transition and a successful integration will 
demand a critical mass of support from leaders at every level. As outlined, this change will be 
implemented in phases and evaluated after each stage is completed. The U.S. Marine Corps 
completed this initial phase in which four women were tested in the infantry course. In 2013, the 
U.S. Marine Corps graduated its first three women from their rigorous and challenging enlisted 
Infantry course and lauded as an absolute success. As of February 2015, 358 women had 
volunteered and 122 had graduated with a 34 percent success rate. As of July 2015, 29 women 
had volunteered for the Marine Infantry Officer Course, but none has yet passed the course 
(Lamothe, 2015). The next stage will be evaluated to determine how these four women will do in 
combat units, if they are placed in such units. The magnitude of the change is enormous because 
the U.S. Army, as of October 2014, issued its timeline to incorporate women into the elite U.S. 
Army Ranger School. On April 20, 2015, 19 women started Ranger Class 06-15. Eight women 
successfully completed the Ranger Assessment Program week; however, all were recycled into 
the next Ranger Class, 07-15 for failing to meet specific patrolling standards, and were given a 
second attempt at patrolling. After the second attempt, five of the eight women were dropped 
from the course, and three women were given a day one recycle into Ranger Class 08-15, and 
started the course again on June 21, 2015. These three women successfully met the standards of 
the Benning Phase and moved on to the Mountain Phase July 10. All three women passed the 
knot test, military mountaineering skills assessment, the foot movement up Mount Yonah, and 
were given opportunities to lead patrols—one woman recycled into Ranger Class 09-15 to start 
the Mountain Phase over. Two women received a passing grade in the mountains during platoon 
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level combat patrols and moved on to the Swamp Phase. The two women also met the standards 
of the Swamp Phase, proficiently leading waterborne platoon level combat patrols, became the 
first women ever to earn the Ranger Tab, and ultimately graduated on August 21, 2015. 
Norway 
The Norwegian women contributed greatly to their country’s military during WWII; 
however, despite the contributions and positive experiences from both the Officer’s Training 
School and the Army Communication School, the Norwegian Parliament debated and decided in 
1953 that women could no longer serve in the Norwegian Military (Steder, 2014, as cited in 
Vaernø & Sveri, 1990). In 1976, the Norwegian Parliament reconsidered its decision and decided 
to allow women into noncombat positions; therefore, the first women to enter officer training 
occurred in 1977 in the Norwegian Air Force; however, the heated debate over women serving in 
combat positions continued until 1984. The Norwegian Parliament introduced the Military 
Occupational Equality [policy] in 1984 (Steder, 2014) for men and women; this policy allowed 
men and women to have the same volunteer opportunity to enter any organization in the 
Norwegian Military. This meant that Norway was the first NATO country to take on this 
decision, and that it became a pioneer country for women in the military. 
In February 2013, select, women troops—from countries that allow full integration along 
with other partnered militaries that have fully integrated—met in Washington, D.C., at the 
Women in Combat Symposium (Haring, 2013) to discuss women’s roles in combat operations. 
One panel included American, Canadian, and Norwegian women who served in the wake of the 
removal of previous exclusionary policies. The panel was asked to identify traits that are critical 
to success in combat. The most common response was that teamwork was of first importance, 
calmness in stressful situations was second, and competence was third. The representatives from 
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Canada, Norway, and Sweden talked about their militaries’ move to full integration. According 
to Haring (2013), all three countries admitted that 
Full integration took more than 10 years, and that today few women serve in the combat 
specialties. Robert Egnell from Sweden provided perspectives that get to the heart of 
fully integrated military organizations. He asserted that integration is not achieved by 
making it an equality issue. Rather, it is more likely achieved by focusing on the 
enhanced capabilities that women bring to the operational success of the force. (p. 58) 
No formal assessments have been conducted in Norway of the effect of mixed-gender 
teams in the combat role; however, the general opinion is that female representation will increase 
operational effect (Cawkill, 2009). No incidents have been reported to indicate that cohesion will 
decrease or that operational effectiveness will be compromised. Gender-related concerns for the 
Norwegian Military are retention and recruitment. To alleviate the stress of diminishing combat 
power and staying with the policy of equality between the genders, as of June 2013, the 
Norwegian Parliament passed a bill that conscripts women into its armed forces, becoming the 
first European and first NATO country to make military service compulsory for both genders 
(Fouche, 2013). 
Canada 
The CAF is right on a par with the American Military employing 17 percent of all 
military personnel as women compared to 16 percent for the United States. However, unlike the 
United States, Canada supports the roles of women in all positions within its military, including 
small combat units. As discussed previously, most policies of integration have attributed to 
political pressure, and Canada is no exception. In 1989, the CHRC (2013) Tribunal decided and 
directed that women must be fully integrated into all CAF roles, except service on submarines. 
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The Minister’s Advisory Board on CAF Gender Integration and Employment Equity 
(Backgrounder, 2001) removed the 2001 restriction. The advisory board had been set up to 
transform beliefs about women’s integration by the “adoption of not only a policy, but also a 
belief in the need for a respectful workplace” (Cawkill et al., 2009, p. 17). 
From the beginning of the CAF integration, many people assumed and believed that the 
changes would affect combat effectiveness and they questioned women’s ability to serve in a 
male “unique” culture. Women did experience sex and gender stereotyping; however, they have 
developed strategies to negotiate and adapt to the CAF culture, and over the years, the CAF has 
improved its understanding of the cultural changes through the increased representation of 
women in leadership roles and on operational deployments with the deployments to Afghanistan 
and Iraq (Cawkill et al., 2009). The Army Lessons Learned Center (1998, as cited in Cawkill et 
al., 2009) stated, 
Cohesion of mixed gender combat arms units was a leadership challenge. In a 
nonhomogeneous environment, there needed to be a search for common ground or a point 
on which all team members could identify, and it was considered a leadership 
responsibility to provide the framework and common ground to facilitate team building. 
The cause of breakdown in unit cohesion, especially where gender was concerned, was 
reported to stem from the following: 
 Inequitable leadership and discipline. 
 Favoritism or harassment of distinct groups. 
 Fraternization (especially within the chain of command). 
 Isolation and segregation of distinct groups. (p. 18) 
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The Army Lessons Learned Center (1998, as cited in Cawkill et al., 2009) acknowledged 
that for a full integration of women into small combat units to be successful, standards must be 
the same for both genders across the board to show fair equality and that competent leadership 
would be instrumental to ensure total success. The CHRC (2013) then decided that sufficient 
leadership commitment existed to ensure that external monitoring was no longer a requirement 
for the integration of women into small combat units. The introduction of women, despite some 
initial resistance, is reported to have provided the opportunity for women to contribute to the 
evolution of culture across the organization and to operational effectiveness (Cawkill et al., 
2009). The Canadian Expeditionary Force (2009, as cited in Cawkill et al., 2009), and the 
Canadian Army Lessons Learned Center (1998, as cited in Cawkill et al., 2009) both reported, 
There have been no gender-related issues arising from current expeditionary operations, 
or awareness of evidence that gender integration has had a negative effect on operational 
performance or team cohesion. In practice, adjustments are made to accommodate the 
successful functioning of mixed-gender units in operations, but in most cases problems 
are resolved “on the ground”. Recruitment of women to the combat arms is progressing at 
a slow pace, but the view from the Gender Integration Office is that the Canadian 
experience would not contribute to arguments justifying the exclusion of women from 
ground combat roles. (p. 20) 
How have the CAF accomplished this? First, by not lowering physical standards, women 
in the armour and infantry branches are required to pass the same assessments as the men. 
Captain Ashley Colette, who was awarded the Medal of Military Valour for leading a combat 
platoon in Afghanistan, carried 210 mannequins in battle exercises. Secondly, after discovering 
that segregating men from women in training led to poor cohesion, the CAF trained women and 
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men together, without exception. Male and female recruits eat together, sleep in the same 
barracks room, and train together; both male and female instructors teach the required courses to 
both genders. 
Israel 
The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the 1995 Israeli Ministry of Defense policy of not 
allowing women into the Israeli Air Force pilot’s course was solely based on gender and, 
therefore, constituted unlawful discrimination (Finestone et al., 2014). This decision initiated 
radical changes in the combat active service opportunities for women in the IDF. Today, women 
serve in combat roles in many IDF units, including the light infantry brigade, artillery, and the 
Border Police. 
Karakal or caracal (light infantry). Karakal is a special battalion that is comprised of 
both women and men. All of the physical training and military training exercises are conducted 
together and are required by all members of the battalion. The unit is fully combat mission ready 
and mainly stationed in the south at the Egyptian border and in the East at the Jordanian border. 
Totchanim (artillery). Women are integrated into the artillery branch in various combat 
and command positions in many fields, for example, command posts over advanced operational 
and attack systems, management and calculation of artillery fire, operation of communication 
devices, and conducting meteorologist case studies to improve artillery fire accuracy. The 
women serve in combat units and complete advanced training after which they are integrated into 
continuous security operations across Israel. The female combatants commit themselves to a 36-
month, mandatory military service and to reserve duty. 
Women in the IDF serve in combat roles voluntarily, and women that do volunteer gain 
the same rights as their male counterparts. Israeli commanders have recognized that women often 
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exhibit superior skills in areas such as discipline and motivation, maintaining alertness, shooting 
abilities, managing tasks in an organized manner, and displaying knowledge and professionalism 
in the use of weapons. Despite this, these women often face the same ongoing battle against 
skepticism and mistrust in the form of teasing from their fellow male combatants and negative 
messages from high-ranking officers. A resistance yet exists to fully integrating women into 
small combat units, but that seems to stem from women taking over an all-male position within 
the forces (cohesion). Although women in the IDF can volunteer for combat positions, it remains 
highly unlikely that they would ever be involved in direct ground combat. Once a combat unit is 
deployed, women are withdrawn from that unit and place in noncombatant assignments or 
evacuated to rear areas. 
 
Figure 4. IDF gender data as of September 2009. From Women in 
Ground Close Combat Roles: The Experiences of other Nations and a 
Review of the Academic Literature, by P. Cawkill, A. Rogers, S. 
Knight, & L. Spear, 2009, Fareham, Hants, UK: Ministry of Defence, 
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Human Systems Group, 
p. 24. 
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Arguments for and Against Women in Combat 
The 2013 decision to integrate American women into the all-male combat specialties was 
met with a full range of reactions. Some people believed that it would degrade American national 
security, and erode combat effectiveness, decision-making, tradition, and even intelligence, as 
archaic as that may seem. For the past 3 years, the reasons for not integrating women into 
combat units centered on two primary concerns: physiology and unit cohesion. The remaining 
trepidations have been demolished by 15 years of combat in which women have performed as 
courageously as have men. 
Universal Arguments 
Goldstein (2001), who is known for work on women in the military, noted, 
Combat forces in the world’s state armies today include several million Soldiers (the 
exact number depending on the definition of combat), of whom 99.9 percent are male’, 
while “there is little historical evidence for the participation of women in war.” (p. 10) 
Goldstein (2001) suggested that, throughout history, armies have identified themselves as 
a masculine force that is motivated by its masculinity to military performance, and sociological 
studies since the end of World War II have supported this interpretation of the phenomena: 
soldiers fight for their (male) comrades. In writing about the Wehrmacht (unified armed forces of 
Germany), Janowitz and Shils (1948) credited the extraordinary performance of this doomed 
army (the Wehrmacht) to the intense personal male bonds within the primary military group. 
Masculinity was a key motivating factor used to encourage solidarity on the line and “the man 
who lived up to the code of the combat soldier had proved his manhood” (Janowitz & Shils, 
1948). King (2000) posited that the bonds that male soldiers made in the 20th century were 
critical (if not vital), were based on trust, and yet exist in the professional military forces today. 
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Although no one would deny the powerful bond among troops, scholars have consistently argued 
that the cohesion–performance effect of today’s professional troops cannot be verified and is not 
proven to depend upon their personal friendships (Mullen & Copper, 1994). On the contrary, 
combat performance—and, specifically, cohesion—relies more on training, professional 
competence, and completing the task. Accordingly, individuals are judged not so much on their 
personal characteristics, but on their professional ability and they are accepted into the section, 
platoon, and company on this basis (King, 2000). 
In 2008, American paratroopers defended a small outpost called Outpost Restrepo, 
named in honor of a young army medic, Juan Restrepo. The outpost was located in the Korengal 
Valley in Afghanistan and is well known because of the vicious battle between 2nd Platoon, 
Battle Company, 173rd Airborne Brigade, and the Taliban. Junger (2010) recounted the peculiar 
kinship among these soldiers. Sergeant Brendan O’Byrne, one of the central figures in Junger’s 
account, rather than amplifying the soldiers’ love for each other, stated, “There are guys in the 
platoon who straight up hate each other, but they would also die for each other. So you kind of 
have to ask, how much could I really hate the guy?” (Junger, 2010, p. 79). The paradox is 
interesting, but can be understood once recognized that cohesion was not dependent on personal 
friendliness, but depended on competence. Specifically, in combat, the soldiers united around 
their training, their drills, and the execution of these collective tasks—whatever their personal 
differences. 
Although scholars debate the cohesion–performance effect among certain groups, in 
combat, Brian Mullen and Carolyn Copper (1994) illustrated that cohesion is based on 
professional competence and not cultural judgment about a persons, religion, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, or their gender. King (2013) noted four individuals, Kier , Belkin , Segal , and 
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MacCoun who were integrally involved in the rescinding of the American Don’t Ask Don’t Tell 
policy, have concluded through their studies that gender becomes less relevant as professional 
competence is prioritized. This professionalism is being judged. As of 2014, women have been 
allowed to enter the U.S. Marine Corps Infantry Training and, in 2015, the U.S. Army is now 
allowing women to enter the U.S. Army Ranger School, and this pattern will continue as the 
American Military moves forward with full female integration into combat units. These pilot 
programs have already proven that a very small minority of physically capable women might be 
integrated into combat units if they are judged on their performance, not their gender, just as 
ethnic minorities and homosexual men have been incorporated before at different points during 
the last 50 years. Substantial evidence exists from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan that 
women have performed equally as men over the last 15 years (the Iraq War officially ended in 
2012). This parity is strongly shown in the military of several foreign nations,  a particularly 
great example of which is the Canadian Army. This force might be advantaged by a liberal 
multicultural and multilingual national culture. Integration began in 1989 with the Canadian 
Army, and it is now widespread and loudly expressed for particular female soldiers. As an 
example of this model, Major Eleanor Taylor, who was an infantry company commander with 
First Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment, in Kandahar in 2009, has been widely identified 
as having the potential to become the first female infantry battalion commander. Female 
Canadian soldiers have affirmed that, as long as professional standards are enforced and they are 
able to meet the standards, they have in fact been able to integrate. 
From observing all three countries, it is clear that, for any organization to accept fully 
integrating women into combat units, leaders must recognize that it will be a leadership 
challenge, not a measure of masculinity. Of interest is the way that the senior leadership of all 
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three countries’ have acknowledged that, for those “on the ground,” no severe drawbacks existed 
from having women in their combat organizations—in fact, the research showed that these 
organizations flourished, made them more efficient, and increased unit cohesion. With the 
American Military accepting the new integration policy in January 2016, it will be fascinating to 
examine how the United States performs compared to the other countries in integrating women 
in their combat units, despite the opponents’ arguments about the disruption of unit cohesion and 
the lowering of standards that might lead operational degradation. 
Two Thematically Common Opinions: Equitable Standards and Unit Cohesion 
The word “standards” has been used broadly in the American Military as a counter 
argument to allowing women in the combat arms segments, the majority of which is individual 
emotion that is used to balance research with impartial scientific data. The major concern is that, 
although standards might not be lowered for women, they will be bent to ensure the direct 
inclusion policy results in complete success, ultimately degrading the reputation and the 
hierarchal world of combat arms. 
Browne (2012) maintained that the commission’s implication that the difference between 
the sexes in strength is solely a consequence of men’s greater size. This assumption is manifestly 
false. Although it is true that, all else being equal, men and women with equally lean body mass 
have largely equivalent strength because male and female muscular tissue is virtually identical. 
All service members receive the same training and must meet the same health standards. For 
example, in the 18th Air Borne Corps, the standard for completing the 12-mile road march is that 
the soldier must carry a load of 35 pounds and a weapon, wear the helmet, and finish the march 
in 3 hours or less—the physical standard is the same for both genders. However, one could argue 
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that carrying equipment or wounded soldiers, is more a function of size rather than gender, and 
that the capabilities of smaller men and larger women overlap. 
Lastly, Browne (2012) concluded that gender integration would diminish cohesion by 
reducing discipline. However, caution should be used when discussing metrics according to 
psychological factors such as cohesion. A significant challenge with laboratory experiments of 
cohesion is that it is difficult, if not impossible, truly to capture the aspect of cohesion that is 
militarily important. The American Military views cohesion as a “performance enabler” rather 
than a “performance enhancer” (Griffith, 2007). It correlates with military performance “by 
maintaining the organized group at its tasks in the face of severe stresses of battle” (Griffith, 
2007 as cited in Marlow, 1979). 
The argument most often used by opponents of integration of women into combat units is 
that physical differences in men and women (including size, strength, and speed) make war-
fighting a strictly male endeavor. According to this argument, women simply do not possess the 
physical characteristics or stamina to be successful ground combat warriors; therefore, allowing 
women to serve in ground combat would negatively affect military effectiveness (Browne, 
2007). Others argued that team cohesion and morale would be negatively affected if women 
were to serve in combat, for men are naturally inclined to protect women (Caidid, 2013). 
Browne (2007) argued that physical differences in men and women are significant and 
that these differences mean that women should not be allowed to perform ground combat jobs. 
Browne’s (2007) evidence included certain differences: “Women have only one-half to two-
thirds the upper body-strength of men” (p. 21). Brown stated that, in addition to inferior strength, 
women run more slowly, have less endurance, and have less aerobic and anaerobic capacity. 
They tend to be shorter and weigh less. Finally, their throwing speed and accuracy is usually less 
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than is that of their male counterparts. Obviously, one cannot doubt the physical differences of 
the sexes; however, the question is now: How relevant are the differences in modern warfare? In 
fact, Maginnis (2013) stated, 
Women in the U.S. Armed Forces are regularly held to lower training standards than 
men. That means that when they’re called into active combat situations, they won’t bring 
the same physical strength and skills training as men do. In training, male marines are 
required to lift 40 pounds, while female trainees must lift only 20. If a ship is sinking and 
the only way to save it is to lift a 40-pound piece of equipment, the female marines will 
be less qualified for the task. On top of this disparity is a looming draft. Security experts 
foresee another American draft within this generation; if women can serve in combat, 
every male and female over the age of 18 will be in danger of being called up. There will 
be ludicrous measures by which women's lesser suitability for combat roles is masked. 
These include lowering the bar of requirements for women wishing to enter combat units, 
placing benches next to walls that trainees jump over (only for the women to use), 
running laps in circles (instead of straight-line runs from point A to point B) to make it 
less obvious that the women are lagging behind the men, and more. (n.p.) 
Mitchell (1997) is a U.S. Army veteran, a 1981 ROTC graduate from the University of 
Cincinnati, Ohio, and a political theorist known for the theory of political difference, theology of 
interpersonal relations, and critical analysis of gender integration of the American armed forces. 
Mitchell believed that bringing women into combat units would yield soaring attrition rates, 
skyrocketing medical costs, lower rates of deployment, and mushrooming levels of single 
parenthood. Mitchell also pointed out that, women have the capability to become pregnant; 
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therefore, pregnancy would be used as an excuse to avoid deployments; therefore, it would raise 
the single parent rate in the U.S. Army. 
Differences between the genders exist and, as in society more generally, policies about 
equitable treatment of both genders continue to evolve. However, when considering women’s 
capacity to serve on the battlefield, the changing structure of warfare shows that the disparity 
plays no role in the capabilities of either gender. Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, wars 
were fought on a linear battlefield; the enemy and friendly lines were distinct. However, the 
2001 attack changed that structure to an asymmetrical battlefield in which the enemy could be 
located adjacent to or in the same battle zone as the American forces. 
Over the past 13 years, more than 60 percent of American combat casualties have been 
the result of improvised explosive devices (Barbero, 2013); therefore, the question of physical 
strength as a discriminatory factor in deciding which soldiers should serve in direct ground 
combat units seems irrelevant. Physical prowess is inconsequential when the most deadly 
weapon a service member faces is an improvised explosive device. In counterinsurgency 
operations, the strongest weapon is not a bullet. A fully loaded M4 Colt rifle used by the U.S. 
Army weighs only 7.5 pounds, and every woman in the U.S. Army must qualify twice annually; 
therefore, it has already establishing that women are efficient in the capability of using the 
weapon if needed. 
One of the principal arguments against having women in combat units is that team 
cohesion and morale would be negatively affected if women were integrated into all male 
combat units, for men are naturally inclined to protect women. Browne (2007) wrote, “Men are 
unlikely to be able to view their comrades as ‘just another soldier’ and are likely to take unwise 
risks in protecting them” (p. 181). 
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Physical Standards 
One primary central concern expressed when discussing the integration of women into 
combat units comes from both proponents and opponents, and it concerns the physical standards 
required and the physical and physiological differences between men and women. The United 
States is working towards establishing its physical standards for the combat arms as decision 
makers’ toil through the years of data from researching the challenges, limitations, and 
acceptance of women, specifically into small combat units. Every other foreign nation that has 
accepted full integration of women into its ranks has already established its own standards for 
military entry and for the different jobs within their armed forces. In the United States, the 
physical standards are different for younger service members compared to older service 
members, and women have different physical standards than their male counterparts. The latter 
has fueled the debate because some argue that, although the standards are different, they are 
actually the same with respect to the amount of energy that is being used by each sex (Burrelli, 
2013). At the heart of the debate is the subject of gender-norming, where many argue that the 
result is often the “lowering” of standards. Another topic of discussion is whether the physical 
standards for certain jobs are a true test of what is realistically needed to perform the jobs 
effectively. 
When studying physical standards of the American Military, it is important to look at the 
evolution or history of the policy regarding standardization across the DoD. Secretary of Defense 
Panetta (1993) said that Federal Law, United States Code, Title 10 of the Armed Forces states: 
(1) Shall ensure that qualification of members of the Armed Forces for, and continuance 
of members of the Armed Forces in, that occupational career field is evaluated on the 
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basis of common, relevant performance standards, without differential standards of 
evaluation on the basis of gender. 
(2) May not use any gender quota, goal, or ceiling except as specifically authorized by 
law. 
(3) May not change an occupational performance standard for the purpose of increasing 
or decreasing the number of women in that occupational career field. (p. 51) 
The execution of the policy, as stated then and as it is now, is not always as clear-cut. 
Burrelli (2013), a specialist in Military Manpower Policy noted 
A plain reading of the term suggests that men and women would be required to meet the 
same physical standards to be similarly assigned. However, in the past, the Services have 
used this and similar terms to suggest that men and women must exert the same amount 
of energy in a particular task, regardless of the work that is actually accomplished by 
either. For example, the Air Force Fitness Test Scoring for males under 30 years of age 
requires males to run 1.5 miles in a maximum time of 13:36 (min:sec): the female 
maximum time is 16:22. A female who runs at this slower rate would actually receive a 
higher score than a male who runs nearly three minutes faster. The minimum number of 
push-ups for males and females in the same age group is 33 and 18, respectively. In the 
case of push-ups, males and females who achieve the minimum passing number of push-
ups receive the same score. As written, this language can be the subject of differing 
interpretations. (p. 12) 
Thus, as the American Military moves forward in further integrating women, lessons can be 
learned by studying other countries’ use of physical standards and the various paths each took 
toward policy change. 
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United States 
The U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps test service members twice a year 
with a running event and two-timed events that test upper body and abdominal strength, with the 
U.S. Air Force testing once a year. The U.S. Navy uses a fourth event to test flexibility, and all 
four branches use gender norming when conducting their respective physical fitness testing. 
Members of the U.S. Army must take the army physical fitness test at least twice per 
year. To be eligible for promotion, transfer, or admittance to a U.S. Army school, one must meet 
the fitness test standards. The physical fitness test involves 2 minutes of pushups, 2 minutes of 
sit-ups and a 2-mile run. Taking one’s age and gender into consideration, each test is scored 
individually. The better one performs on the test, the higher one’s score. To pass the test, one 
must receive a score of 60 or higher for each individual event, with a cumulative score of at least 
180. The special operations U.S. Army Rangers are subjected to stricter standards and must 
undertake a pull-up test, 5-mile run, 16-mile hike, and 15-meter swim. 
The U.S. Marine Corps tests abdominal strength with the same 2-minute timed sit-ups as 
the U.S. Army, but the abdominal strength test is a “crunch”-type exercise. Instead of arms 
clasped behind their heads, marines will fold them across their chests or rib cages. One repetition 
is counted when the forearms touch the thighs, and they return to the start position. Marines 
cannot bounce or arch their lower backs, and their buttocks must remain in contact with the floor. 
The U.S. Marine Corps modified the sit-up to provide a better evaluation of abdominal strength 
and to reduce the potential for neck and back injuries (Borlik, 1998). The number of repetitions 
to achieve the maximum score is 100 for both men and women. 
Instead of push-ups, marines do untimed pull-up tests and are scored according to how 
many pull-ups they can complete before dropping from the bar. Female marines take the flexed-
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arm-hang test in place of the pull-ups test. For this test, the score is determined by how long the 
marine hangs on the bar with proper elbow flexion. The 3-mile run is scored according to the 
time it takes to complete the run. The total score from all three events must meet the U.S. Marine 
Corps Physical Fitness Test third-class standards. The minimum score is 135 for the Age 17–26 
group, 110 for the Age 27–39 group, 88 for the Age 40–45 group and 65 for marines Age 46 and 
older. 
The U.S. Navy’s physical readiness test involves a 2-minute pushups test, 2-minute sit-
ups test, and 1.5-mile run. All three tests are given individual scores according to the sailor’s age, 
gender, and performance. These three scores are then added together and divided by three to 
obtain the sailor’s average score. To graduate from U.S. Navy boot camp, students need an 
average score of at least 60. After boot camp, sailors need an average score of at least 50. 
Training to be a U.S. Navy Sea Air Land (SEAL) Forces involves a much more strenuous 
physical fitness test. The U.S. Navy SEALS’ basic underwater demolition test involves a 500-
yard swim, 2-minute pushups test, 2-minute sit-ups test, untimed pull-ups test, and a 1.5-mile 
run. The SEALS must meet minimum standards in all five tests to pass successfully. 
The U.S. Air Force physical fitness test requires airmen to complete a 1-minute pushups 
test, 1-minute sit-ups test, and a 1.5-mile run. Similar to the U.S. Army, the three individual 
scores from the U.S. Air Force physical fitness test are added together to obtain a cumulative 
score. Airmen with a cumulative score of 90 or higher are considered “excellent,” while a total 
score of 75 to 89.9 is considered “good.” A total score of 70 to 74.9 falls into the “marginal” 
category, while a score of less than 70 falls into the “poor” category. Airmen scoring in the 
“excellent” or “good” categories must take the physical fitness test only once per year. Airmen 
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scoring in the “marginal” or “poor” categories must take the test every 3 months, along with 
attending a health and fitness program. 
Norway 
In the Norwegian Armed Forces, various alternatives are available to the physical fitness 
testing requirements, rather using gender norming standards or intervals of taking the tests. 
Regardless, all entry-level recruits, cadets in basic officer training, all compulsory military 
personnel in basic training, and all permanently employed officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel 
are subject to physical fitness testing. They have the choice of testing themselves on multiple 
occasions, using multiple tests, and in these tests, they can choose which of the best results they 
wish to count. Personnel over 50 years of age take the tests on an equal footing with other 
military personnel, although with no regard to the time requirements of the tests. Such test 
programs are meant to emphasize the health-enhancing effect of being physically active. 
The physical fitness test for compulsory personnel consists of one form of aerobic 
activity and three strength requiring activity. The testing of the 3000-meter run, and the pull-up, 
sit-up, and the push-up events are administered 3 times: within 3 weeks of entering, before 
transferring from training to different parts of military service, and within the final quarter before 
leaving military service. With the pull-up event, men hang vertically with hands in an overhand 
grip and the feet off the floor, the extended body is then raised until the chin is above the upper 
part of the beam and lowered until the arms are fully extended. For women, the same body 
movement is required; however, they hang horizontally from a gymnastics beam with the hands 
in an overhand grip and the arms and legs extended, and the heels are placed on a bench or 
something similar to achieve a horizontal starting position. The service member then lifts her 
body until the chest touches the beam and lowers it until the arms are fully extended. The sit-up 
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event is performed in a normal fashion except that the legs are positioned on a box, bent at the 
knee, with the buttocks touching the side of the box being used and the push-up is performed as 
in the American Military. Officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel are obligated to take a physical 
fitness test of their own choosing anytime between January 1 and December 15. The test 
program is divided into three groups with Group A consisting of individual aerobic activities, 
and Group B a selection of physically demanding proficiency badges in which a passed 
proficiency test corresponds to a score of 4 and a passed proficiency test in two or more badges 
to a score of 6. Group C is a selection of proficiency badges and a 15-kilometer walking test, in 
which a passed proficiency test corresponds to the minimum military physical standard, which is 
a score of 2. As with the compulsory personnel, Norwegian women officers, NCOs, and enlisted 
members are tested using gender norming standards. 
 
Figure 5. Norwegian classification of test scores in the 3000m run for compulsory military 
personnel. From Physical Fitness Tests in the Nordic Armed Forces: A Description of Basic Test 
Protocols, by J. Malmberg, 2011, Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Defence University College, 
Norwegian School of Sports Sciences/Defence Institute, p. 77–78. Adapted with permission. 
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Figure 6. Norwegian classification of test scores in pull-ups for compulsory military personnel. 
From Physical Fitness Tests in the Nordic Armed Forces: A Description of Basic Test Protocols, by 
J. Malmberg, 2011, Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Defence University College, Norwegian School 
of Sports Sciences/Defence Institute, p. 77–78. Adapted with permission. 
 
Figure 7. Norwegian classification of test scores in sit-ups for compulsory military personnel. From 
Physical Fitness Tests in the Nordic Armed Forces: A Description of Basic Test Protocols, by J. 
Malmberg, 2011, Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Defence University College, Norwegian School of 
Sports Sciences/Defence Institute, p. 77–78. Adapted with permission. 
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Figure 8. Norwegian classification of test scores in push-ups for compulsory military personnel. 
From Physical Fitness Tests in the Nordic Armed Forces: A Description of Basic Test Protocols, by 
J. Malmberg, 2011, Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Defence University College, Norwegian School 
of Sports Sciences/Defence Institute, p. 77–78. Adapted with permission. 
Canada 
In Canada, physical fitness standards are gender-neutral and women are allowed to serve 
in any capacity in the CAF, as long as they meet the standards for each position. Three fitness 
standards (selection, maintenance, and course) are used in the Canadian military and each has its 
own purpose (Matsel et al., 2012). The selection standards that are the most challenging are the 
elite antiterrorism unit, Joint Task Force-2, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment, the CAF 
Department of National Defense Fire Fighters, and the Search and Rescue technicians (Matsel et 
al., 2012). The standards are gender-neutral; therefore, it is not necessary to describe each fitness 
standard at length; however, Matsel et al. (2012) depicted all standards, and the selection 
standards, which are the most demanding: 
 1.5-mile run in less than 9 minutes, 45 seconds. 
 40 push-ups with no rests. 
 40 sit-ups in 1 minute. 
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 Five over-hand, straight-arm pull-ups. 
 Bench press 143.3 pounds from chest to full arm extension (one time). 
 CAF Swim Test. 
If an applicant meets all of the minimum standards, he or she is awarded 55 points; 
however, it takes a total of 75 points to pass the test. Therefore, an applicant must achieve 
more than the minimum standard in at least some test categories (p. 49). 
Maintenance standards are designed to “ensure that CAF personnel attain and maintain 
the necessary level of physical fitness to perform common military tasks or occupation specific 
tasks” (Matsel et al., 2012, p. 51). Course standards are used to ensure that personnel have a 
minimum physical fitness level to apply for additional certifications. Many similarities are found 
between the selected countries regarding the physical events, structure of their physical standards 
and the challenges women faced when applying for the positions. Studies that each country has 
conducted on integrating women into military occupational specialties heavily influence these 
standards. Even when applied in a neutral setting, the perception is that the standards were yet 
lowered to appear that the challenges were yet equal. Matsel et al, (2012) stated that, although the 
standards were the same for both men and women, some personnel perceived that enforcement 
of the standards was inconsistent, and that double standards were applied. They noted the 
retention rather than the release of women who did not pass standards, the (informal) lowering of 
battle school standards for women, instructors treating women differently (i.e., being more 
lenient or afraid to discipline), and favoritism toward women (i.e., women were asked if they 
need a bathroom break more frequently than were men). 
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Israel 
In Israel, the military’s combat fitness department adapted the physical standards required 
for the elite units to make them suitable for women. Therefore, the men in those units will be 
required to meet the same standards, rather than their more rigorous standards. Military 
regulations were also adjusted to enable the entry of women into the units (Poch, 2014). 
This situation is quite different from any other country, especially the United States. 
Although most personnel will either enforce gender-neutral standards or enact some sort of 
gender-norming standards, Israel devised a mixture of the two standards. For example, if the IDF 
policy states that women are allowed 7 hours of sleep and men are only allowed 6 hours, now 
men and women will be allowed 7 hours of sleep. 
Unit Cohesion 
MacCoun (1993) argued that two types of cohesion actually exist. According to 
MacCoun, social cohesion refers to the quality of the bonds of friendship and emotional 
closeness among unit members. However, task cohesion refers to the commitment among unit 
members to accomplish a task that requires the collective efforts of the unit. Wong, Kolditz, 
Millen, and Potter (2003) contradictorily argued that successful unit performance is determined 
by social cohesion rather than task cohesion. Wong et al. (2003) ignored 
a large body of empirical research on military and nonmilitary groups showing that social 
cohesion has no independent impact on performance. They provide no evidence for the 
representativeness of the interview quotes they cite as evidence or for the reliability or validity of 
their measures. Their methodology fails to meet social science standards for causal inference  
(p. 1). 
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RAND (2010) conducted an extensive review of MacCoun (1993) on unit cohesion 
regarding the two aspects of social and task cohesion. All evidence indicated that task cohesion 
is much more important to unit accomplishment than social cohesion and some of the studies 
disclosed that high social cohesion among groups is linked to negative group behaviors. 
The need to distinguish task cohesion from social cohesion is profoundly interesting and 
important. Scholars such as Mullen and Copper (1994) have found that these distinctions have 
profound consequences for predicting and influencing unit performance. They have repetitively 
found that task cohesion has a small but reliable correlation with group performance, whereas 
social cohesion has no reliable correlation with performance, and at high levels, it can even 
undermine task performance. Mullen and Copper (1994) analyzed 66 cohesion performance 
correlations from 49 studies; they found that the relationship between cohesion and performance 
was “due primarily to commitment to task rather than interpersonal attraction or group pride” (p. 
210). Mullen and Copper’s (1994) established in their meta-analytic review that, if an argument 
for the cohesion–performance effect exists, it is that task cohesion not social cohesion correlates 
with performance. 
Browne (2007) argued that physiological factors and threat to unit cohesion make women 
completely unsuitable to serve in direct ground combat units. Browne further argued that women 
leaders adversely affect morale, and that men cannot be socialized to accept women as equals, 
especially during combat operations. Browne cited a wide range of research in the fields of 
anthropology, biology, and psychology to support the claims. Browne theorized that lifting the 
exclusion of women from ground combat would be deeply irresponsible and could not be taken 
seriously, and that the change would be about diversity, not about military effectiveness. Browne 
further said that those whose expertise is combat, not diversity, should analyze this integration 
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policy, for major biological and psychological (cohesion) differences. Browne categorized three 
fields of research to support the theory: anthropology, biology, and psychology. 
Browne (2012) analyzed the MDLC’s (2010) recommendation to allow women into 
ground combat, often citing Browne (2007). Browne (2012) further broke down the three fields 
into pregnancy (anthropology), physical strength (biology) and cohesion (psychology). 
Browne (2012) raised questions about women’s participation in combat and argued that 
pregnancy presents a substantial readiness challenge. Browne also noted that women sometimes 
intentionally become pregnant to avoid deployments, which inevitably causes rifts among the 
male troops and decreases morale. For statistical purposes, Browne gathered data from the U.S. 
Army to gain a snapshot of what might occur in other branches of the American Military such as 
the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Marine Corps. 
Although the American Military, (as cited in Grindlay & Grossman, 2013) maintains 
records of military pregnancy rates, it does not release them; nevertheless, it estimates in its 
survey that the number is approximately 11 percent. The 11 percent rate would be equivalent to 
8,250 soldiers not available to deploy because they are pregnant. Moreover, this survey was 
conducted while the U.S. Army was engaged in fighting two wars simultaneously. The 
percentage might seem high; therefore, one could assume that Browne (2007, 2012) had a valid 
argument. However, to place these numbers in perspective, one should look closely at the 
nonavailable rates for an organization that has only males—the U.S. Army’s Unit of Act, a 
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) that maintains an average of 5,000 male soldiers. 
Arnold, Drennan, Hoffman, Orgeron, and Willough (2011) provided data that indicate on 
any given day, approximately 75,000 soldiers are categorized as unable to deploy or are non-
available. This number represents 13 percent of the U.S. Army’s authorized end strength, and the 
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reasons categorized as non-deployable were administrative, legal, and medical conditions. 
Arnold et al. further broke down the non-available personnel by BCTs: 
 In fiscal year 2010, nearly 14.5 percent of soldiers in BCTs were unable to deploy by 
the unit’s deployment date, which was up from 9.9 percent in 2007. 
 From fiscal years 2007–2011, the average number of soldiers per BCT who were 
unable to deploy on their deployment date steadily increased: 2007 – 391 (9.9%); 
2008 – 467 (12%); 2009 – 502 (13%); and 2010 – 567 (14.5%). 
At the time, it was estimated that the U.S. Army personnel office expected the non-deployable 
rate to be as high as 16 percent in 2012. Arnold et al. maintained that, if the current upward trend 
in the percentage of non-deployable soldiers in a BCT were not reversed, it could jeopardize the 
combat readiness of deploying units. 
In analyzing the 11 percent of women in the military who were pregnant, one finds that 
the American Military (2008, as cited in Grindlay & Grossman, 2013) conducted the survey on 
all military, not merely the U.S. Army. Nevertheless, for comparison, one could rationally state 
that this average could easily be equivalent to the U.S. Army data (Arnold et al., 2011). One 
must consider that 11 percent of the 75,000 women in the U.S. Army is equivalent to 8,250 
women non-available for deployment. There are 10 BCTs currently in the U.S. Army inventory. 
Therefore, using only a 14 percent nonavailable average that occurred in 2010, the number of 
non-available personnel is 7,000 males out of 50,000 of an all-male unit. When analyzing the 
numbers of non-available personnel, by comparison, it could be reasonably assumed that 
pregnancy has the same bearing on mission readiness as legal, administrative, and medical non-
available personnel in all male units. 
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Current Situation of Military Gender Integration in the United States  
and other Foreign Countries 
Under the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule of 1994 (DoD, 2013), 
women in the American military were excluded from assignments in which the primary mission 
was to engage in direct ground combat, and were permitted to be excluded from other 
assignments in certain circumstances. On January 24, 2013, then Secretary of Defense Panetta 
rescinded that policy, along with endorsement from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Dempsey, and the services were directed to open the closed positions and units to 
women not later than January 1, 2016. The underlying principle behind repeal of the 1994 policy 
was that no individual who wants to serve her or his country should be forbidden from 
competing for or serving in any military capacity solely because of gender. Instead, every 
soldier, sailor, aviator, and marine should be judged on individual merit and ability. According to 
Secretary of Defense Panetta and General Dempsey (2013), it was and yet is their belief that 
merit-based military assignments strengthen and enhance the Nation’s military readiness and 
effectiveness. The change in policy also correctly reflects “on the ground” realities in which 
women, particularly in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have long served side by side with men 
in ground combat to which 15 years of conflict can attest. 
The change in policy directive and guidance provide timelines for action that each branch 
of service must complete. Each department had to provide detailed plans for implementation by 
May 15, 2013, and to provide quarterly progress reports to the Secretary of Defense thereafter, 
validate gender-neutral occupational standards not later than September 2015, and complete all 
studies by October 2015. The directive also stated that the integration of women into newly 
opened positions and units must occur “as expeditiously as possible,” but not later than January 
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1, 2016. The DoD has been tracking, monitoring, and providing oversight of the services’ and 
SOCOM’s integration efforts, but does not have plans to monitor the services’ implementation 
progress after January 2016 in integrating women into newly opened positions and occupations. 
 The largest numbers of closed positions are in the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps; 
there are fewer closed positions in the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force. All the services 
have closed positions that are cross-assigned to SOCOM. 
 Since the 2013 directive and guidance, as of March 2015, the DoD gave notice to the 
U.S. Congress of its intention to open approximately 91,000 total positions in the U.S. 
Army (including certain positions cross-assigned to SOCOM), the U.S. Navy, and the 
U.S. Marine Corps. Most of these positions are in MOS already open to women. 
 The U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps are the only services requesting 
an exception to policy. 
 Calendar year 2015 is the last year of the transition period. Information has been 
scarce, progress to date has been spotty, and the services’ implementation processes 
raise several concerns. 
Interagency Activities 
The DoD has left it to each of the separate branches of the American Military to develop 
its own methods for establishing valid occupational standards and make other integration 
decisions and their individual plans has variable levels of detail and take very different 
approaches. Furthermore, 2 years into the 3-year transition period, the U.S. Marine Corps did not 
meet its original planned deadline of December 2013 to validate physical standards, develop 
physical screening tests, and recommend any exemptions. Therefore, the U.S. Marine Corps 
(2013, as cited in National Women’s Law Center, 2015) outlined a new integration plan, without 
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explanation for the changes. How the American Military and SOCOM are working together to 
validate standards or make integration decisions for positions cross-assigned to SOCOM is 
unclear; however, it is safe to assume that open communication occurs between the various 
branches up to the DoD. In addition, the required quarterly progress reports have not been made 
public, which leaves one wondering to what extent the DoD is overseeing the implementation of 
the plans. 
A slight delay has occurred in assigning women to open MOS in closed units and, as of 
mid-2015, the timing only allows for another 5 months until full implementation. Many women 
have already qualified in the open occupations that are in closed units, and both the U.S. Army 
(2013) and the U.S. Marine Corps (2013) report that, when women have been assigned to 
positions in previously closed units, they have performed well. The U.S. Army has opened all 
positions in closed units (with the exception of certain positions in Special Operations units) to 
women in open MOS, and the U.S. Marine Corps has opened only a few such positions to 
women, none of which are in combat arms units. Therefore, in the American Military, only the 
U.S. Army has opened any positions that are cross-assigned to SOCOM. 
The U.S. Marine Corps’ implementation plan, outlined in 2014 is hushed on how it is 
establishing and validating gender-neutral standards for all of its MOS. The focus of the plan 
involves several studies encompassing women who volunteer for the Infantry Officers Course, 
the enlisted Infantry Training Battalion, and a new Ground Combat Element Integrated Task 
Force. Women volunteers will take time away from their current career paths to participate in the 
training, but they are not able to be members of the closed MOS unit even if they meet the 
requirements. Notably, the U.S. Marine Corps has not announced what is being evaluated, how 
the results will be used, how data gathered will be used in deciding whether to request that any 
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occupation or unit remain closed, and particularly whether and how the physical tests that are 
part of the studies have been validated as occupational requirements. The U.S. Marine Corps 
(2014, as cited in the National Women’s Law Center, 2015) has stated that the Ground Combat 
Element Integrated Task Force study will test whether a gender-integrated unit will perform as 
well as a gender-restricted unit, review and refine gender-neutral occupational standards, and 
quantify the tasks, conditions and standards that have previously been “largely qualitative” (p. 3). 
 
Figure 9. Changes in and status of military service opportunities for women as of March 2015. From “GAO analysis 
of DOD data, military personnel: DOD is expanding combat service opportunities for women, but should monitor 
long-term integration progress,” by U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015, July 20, Washington, DC: 
Author. Adapted with permission. 
Conclusion 
The decision in 2013 to rescind the Combat Exclusion Policy (DoD, 1994) and to 
integrate women into direct ground combat units is a monumental victory for proponents of 
gender integration and for those who have maintained the continuous battle to remove all barriers 
to women’s service in the military. The American public, policy makers, and stakeholders realize 
that the nature of the battlefield has forever changed since the Persian Gulf War, and the 
American Military must be more accepting of women filling diverse roles in the military. 
This study was conducted under the assumption that the 2013 decision would be upheld 
and that there would be full implementation of the integration policy in January 2016, or shortly 
thereafter. It was assumed that, when the policy is implemented, the leaders of every branch and 
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at every leadership level would conduct themselves professionally and enforce whatever 
standard is assigned to them, even if they do not fully agree across the entire American Military. 
With these assumptions, near-term and long-term questions will require answers; the near-term 
questions will be answered through normal reporting procedures and data collection; the far-term 
questions will require further research and will be answered after more information will be 
gleaned within 5–10 years after full integration. 
United States 
The DoD’s goal is to ensure that the American Military mission is met with the best, 
most fully qualified, and most capable people, regardless of gender. To that end, each service 
and SOCOM is working with various scientific and research agencies to review and validate 
operational standards to ensure that they are current, definitively tied to an operational 
requirement, and applied on a gender-neutral basis. Each service and SOCOM is conducting a 
thorough doctrine, training, education, facilities and policy analysis to ensure deliberate and 
responsible implementation; finally, each service and SOCOM has identified decision points by 
which they will make final determinations to open occupations and positions or to request an 
exception to policy to keep a position or occupation closed. The Secretary of Defense and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must personally approve any exceptions to policy. 
Early in November 2014, the U.S. Army’s Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade 
stationed at Fort Benning Georgia selected 31 female soldiers to serve as observers and advisers 
for a potential Ranger Course Assessment that would begin in the spring of 2016. The female 
observers and advisors assisted the Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade cadre in observing all 
major blocks of instruction and training during this assessment, but not serve as U.S. Ranger 
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instructors or train and evaluate female U.S. Ranger students, but only assist current male U.S. 
Ranger instructors. 
The observer and advisers include 11 officers and 20 NCOs. Beginning November 7, 
2015, the female soldiers were involved in weekly training events to prepare them to understand 
the mental and physical demands placed on U.S. Ranger students. Major General Miller, 
commanding General of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (as cited in Department of the Army 
Public Affairs, 2014), stated, 
I was very satisfied with both the quality and quantity of the volunteers we received, their 
performance and professionalism over the course of the week was extraordinary. This 
group did very well for what was a very physically challenging week for any Soldier. 
(n.p.) 
On July 10, 2015, the U.S. Army released an All Army Activities message 113-2015, 
stating that the U.S. Army (a) opened all positions in open occupations, encompassing 60,000 
positions in all components; (b) validated the physical standards for all occupations, including 
those currently closed to women; (c) completed its gender integration study; (d) opened 20,563 
positions in MOS 12B (combat engineer) to women, and that (e) all remaining occupations and 
positions will be opened to women in 2016, unless the army requests an exception to the policy, 
according to a rigorous analysis of factual data regarding the knowledge, skills, and abilities 
needed for the position. The U.S. Army is moving towards a qualitative accessions strategy, and 
Soldier 2020 is the U.S. Army’s effort to enhance the force readiness through implementing a 
scientific approach for verifying and evaluating MOS-specific physical performance 
requirements. 
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Norway 
On October 14, 2014, the Norwegian parliament passed a bill extending mandatory 
military service to women as part of a plan to promote gender equality, and in January 2015, this 
measure to increase general-neutral conscription became effective, which might lead to an even 
larger influx of women into the service. In Norway, women are accepted in combat roles in an 
effort to reflect their status as equals within their society; however, attitudes, behavior, and 
cultural barriers are probably the greatest obstacles to women’s opportunities and influence their 
desire to make military service a lasting career (Fugslet, 2015). 
Today, Norway, led by an arduous front-line of women, including Prime Minister Erna 
Solberg and her mostly female cabinet, including Defense Minister Ine Eriksen, is leading the 
charge to an inclusive, cohesive unisex Defense Force. They want the Armed Services to become 
as progressive and gender-blind as the top echelons of government. Norway has even further 
integrated the sexes by adopting same-sex living arrangements in some units, which has raised 
international scrutiny. However, this has occurred for several years in the Norwegian Armed 
Forces and, for the service members, this is old news. 
Bergstrom (2014) conducted a gender research study in Norway in March 2014 and 
established that unisex rooms made gender insignificant, finding that the Norwegian Army 
described the phenomenon as degenderization: “When boys and girls shared the same room, 
gender was no longer significant” (np). Lilleaas and Ellingsen (2014) reported on a study of 
Norway’s Armed Forces, finding, counter to their expectations, that the recent introduction of 
unisex rooms in the Norwegian Army was associated with a decline in sexual assault. Unisex 
dorms broke down the barriers associated with gender disruptiveness and was replaced by a 
shared position as soldiers (Ruppanner, 2014). The main conclusion of this study is that male and 
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female soldiers can live harmoniously in a shared space without increase in sexual violence 
against women. 
Canada 
Canada is considered extremely progressive regarding the proportion of women in its 
military and the areas in which they can serve. The CAF are vastly considered as being at the 
forefront of military gender integration. Women can enlist in any occupation, which includes 
operational trades, and serve in any environment. In all trades, Canadian men and women are 
selected for training, promotions, and all career opportunities equally in the same way that is 
based on rank, qualifications, and merit. 
Throughout the 1990s, the introduction of women into the combat arms increased the 
potential recruiting pool by 100 percent (Women in the CAF, 2014). It also provided 
opportunities for all persons to serve their country to the best of their abilities. Today, all 
equipment must be suitable for a mixed-gender force. Combat helmets, rucksacks, combat boots, 
and flak jackets are designed to ensure that women have the same level of protection and comfort 
as their male counterparts. The women’s uniform is similar in design to the men’s uniform, but 
conforms to the female figure, and is functional and practical. 
As of January, the CAF (2014) quoted the percentage of women in the CAF, Regular 
Force, and Primary Reserve combined was at 14.8 percent, with more than 9400 women in the 
Regular Force and more than 4800 women in the Primary Reserve. The Royal Canadian Air 
Force comprises the highest percentage of women at 18.7 percent. Similarly, the Royal Canadian 
Navy has a representation of women of 18.4 percent and the Canadian Army 12.4 percent. 
Women today are joining the CAF with the broadest range of options for occupations and career 
advancement. Just less than 500 Canadian soldiers, sailors, aviators, and airwomen are currently 
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serving with task forces deployed on expeditionary operations by Canadian Joint Operations 
Command. Although the CAF do not keep track of the gender of deployed personnel, one can 
safely assume that qualified women are serving on the majority of the combat missions. 
Israel 
In 2014, the IDF Artillery Corps opened its elite unit to female soldiers for the first time. 
Although they have played supporting roles in artillery combat units for well over a decade, it 
marked the first time that the elite unit accepted females. Six female soldiers from the August 
2014 draft passed the physical aptitude test that allowed them to join the elite Moran, Meitar, and 
Skyrider units, part of the Artillery Corps’ David’s Sling Formation (Poch, 2014). 
The Skyrider unit is one of the units in the IDF that uses drones; its mission is to gather 
intelligence from hard to reach locations and the service requires all soldiers carry extremely 
heavy equipment for long periods. The women that make the decision to enlist for the Skyrider 
organization will commit to 3 years of military service, the same term that men serve. Normally, 
women are only required to serve 2 years in the IDF, unless they are part of a specialized unit, 
such as this. 
Female soldiers wishing to serve in elite combat units have already had a number of 
options open to them, such as serving as a naval commander, air force pilot, in antiaircraft 
divisions, combat intelligence, combat search and rescue, the Owl division of the Engineering 
Corps and the K9 Oketz unit attached to Golani, as well as the technological combat unit. This is 
the first instance of female soldiers being allowed into elite combat units in the armored 
divisions. Early in 2014, the IDF reported in Israel Hayom (as cited in Poch, 2014) a 64 percent 
rise in women volunteering for combat roles in the IDF. 
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According to Artillery Corps Base Commander Col. Yuval Ben-Dov, the military’s 
combat fitness department adapted the physical standards required for the elite units to 
make them suitable for women. As a result, the men in those units will be required to 
meet the same standards, rather than more rigorous ones. Military regulations were also 
adjusted to enable the entry of women into the units, the majority of the jobs in these 
units require strong mental fitness, and for that, there is no difference between women 
and men. (n.p.) 
Summary 
In this chapter, I explored the gender-integration policies of the United States and other 
foreign countries, the arguments for and against integration, the two common themes that are 
considered problematic because of integration, and the current situation pertaining to integration 
within the American Military and observations of other countries’ successes. In the process, the 
history of women in combat, the practice, and recent battlefield demands were brought to light, 
and the research demonstrated how women have proven themselves on the battlefields in a 
multitude of ways, from wars of previous centuries to the present day. 
Although the debate surrounding the new policy of the integration of women into ground 
combat units yet exists, a focus on full implementation is necessary, for members of the military 
have no choice but to accept the change. By examining other countries’ policies on integration as 
the research demonstrates here, military analysts will now have the background to further 
examine and study how to integrate women successfully and will have the ability to mitigate 
future challenges. In today’s asymmetrical battlefields, as seen in the Middle East and other hot 
spots around the world, all military personnel, whether American or foreign allies, serve in 
harm’s way. Women’s roles in the American Military have expanded over time as policies have 
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changed, providing greater opportunity; often in response to mounting pressure of equal rights, 
but also because of the development of new roles to meet the needs of the leaders on the ground. 
As these commanders look for new ways to increase the effectiveness of their units, the 
increasing roles of women have bridged the gap between policy and practice; further 
necessitating the requirement to have women in combat. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
Any policy that is implemented at the local organization level or at the national level 
(e.g., the American Military full integration policy) requires multiple levels of debate, surveys, 
and interviews from stakeholders. When applying a policy analysis at a level of the DoD, I used 
an approach that is broad and versatile and reflects the field of applied policy research and 
advice, where a multitude of perspectives and methods have been developed. The model serves 
three purposes: understanding policy analysis as a discipline, contributing to the design of new 
policy analysis methods and projects, and guiding others in evaluating such methods and 
projects. I will restate the policy activities and policy styles reviewed in Chapter 3 and provide 
the findings and recommendations for current and future leaders of the American Military. The 
conclusion further addresses research on full integration that will need to be completed within 5-
10 years. 
As noted in Figure 10, six archetypal policy analysis activities exist along the points of 
the hexagon with congruent analysis styles located between two of the points. This conceptual 
model allowed me to develop the approach to the method used in the research by combining 
insights from two styles that are adapted from the activities. The activities provide pointers or a 
road map to evaluate the policies by identifying those activities to pursue and use that 
information as the basis for the successful analysis. First, I will discuss the four activities along 
points aligned according to the relevancy with the analysis styles used in the policy exploration 
of integrating women into combat units. 
 84 
 
 
Activity and Style Approach to Policy Analysis 
 
Figure 10. Policy criteria graph. From “Perspectives on policy analyses: a framework for understanding and design” 
by I. Mayer, C. Daalen, and P. Bots, 2004, International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management, 4(2), p. 
16. Copyright 2004 by Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. Adapted with permission. 
Research and Analysis Activity 
One level of analysis was based on direct comparisons across cases guided according to 
three questions: 
1. Have the amount of sexual harassment claims dramatically increased, decreased, or 
stayed the same in the countries that have already integrated women into combat 
roles? 
2. Are women performing at the same level as their male counterparts? 
3. Has there been a shift in the cultural climate where women have integrated? 
These questions and other, similar questions are relevant to policy analysis; are about 
facts, causes, and effects; and are the drivers of this research. According to Mayer et al. (2004), 
policy analysis is undeniably a form of applied research that uses research methods and 
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techniques that are scientific or derived from science, such as surveys, interviews, statistical 
analysis, but also simulation and extrapolation. The research and analyze cluster activity is 
matched with a perspective on policy analysis identified as knowledge generation where 
institutions such as statistical agencies, scientific research organizations and other research 
agencies gather and analyze, on request, knowledge and information for policy purposes. This 
activity fits within this research on integration of women policy change because the political 
agenda influences research priorities, and the results of the research activities might influence the 
political agenda. 
Clarify Values and Arguments 
This activity is about the “what” or “why” a conflict of opinions exists between 
proponents and opponents of the issues in this policy analysis. The prolonged military conflicts 
(e.g., the 15 years of continuous war in Afghanistan or the prolonged conflicted discussion over 
the past 20 years) pertain to the integration of women into combat units and social beliefs 
surrounding that decision. Conflicting beliefs have created a stalemate and often are described 
through central normative and argumentative differences. In this activity, policy analysis is used 
to improve the quality of debate by identifying the one-sided or limited nature of arguments and 
examining where blind spots or gaps exist in the debate. 
Democratize 
The democratize activity is ultimately as straightforward as the word itself—this policy 
analysis maintains a normative and ethical objective that allows equal access to, and influence 
on, the policy process for all stakeholders involved. Experts and senior military leaders are 
involved in this process at the DoD level; therefore, they mandate the decision. However, policy 
analysis approaches address this top-down approach by calling attention to views and opinions 
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that lead to or maintain inequality typically overlooked in policymaking and decision-making 
about access. 
Mediate 
Within the larger discussion of integrating women into combat units, obviously, some 
leaders support it and some do not, but some leaders might support the policy if they are given 
the right information and are involved in the decision-making process. Here, analysts supervise 
the interaction and designs the rules and procedures for negotiating in a policymaking or 
decision-making process. The mediation cluster comprises different types of activities with a 
focus on analyzing contextual factors (stakeholders, issues, dependencies, tensions, and 
tradeoffs), and designing and possibly facilitating meetings in which different stakeholders and 
decision makers consult and negotiate. The policy analyst mediates during the design of the 
negotiation process and its execution (Mayer et al., 2004). 
Depending on the specific policy analysis design, one, two, or more clusters might be 
involved and might prevail over the others, while the remaining might become subordinate or 
irrelevant. The activities are designed in a logical way and are closely related, for the farther the 
activities are from each other, the greater will be the field of tension, and the more difficult 
unification will become. This situation does not imply that the activities are discordant; they are 
yet connected as the illustration suggests; it simply means that the tension must be resolved. 
Argumentative Style 
For this policy analysis, I used the argumentative and interactive styles for their relevance 
to and alignment with the problem. These two approaches are impelling archetypes. The 
argumentative style assumes that policy is made, defended, and criticized through the medium of 
language (Mayer et al., 2004). When analyzing policy using the argumentative style, it is 
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important to listen carefully to the semantical game that surrounds the policy problem or the 
issue. The attention of the issue will shift to a debate, and, within the debate, rhetoric, arguments, 
untruths, and facts will be injected that are not based on any type of scientific or academic 
review. The ambition of this type of policy analysis is to inject recommendations and 
improvements on the policy to those parties who have been cross-talking for years and to bridge 
the gap between opponents. 
Interactive Style 
This research site and scope of the analysis addresses the policy of women integrating 
into combat units; therefore, the second style I chose is the interactive style. According to Mayer 
et al. (2004), the interactive style assumes that individuals—experts, analysts, clients, 
stakeholders and target groups—have or may have differing views of the “same” policy 
problem. An insight relevant to policy can be obtained by bringing about a confrontation 
and interaction of different views. The interactive style has a strong socio-constructive 
foundation. Different views of reality can be valid simultaneously. Through continuous 
interaction and interpretation—the “hermeneutic circle”—it is possible to gain an insight. 
(p. 14) 
With interactive style, specific groups such as stakeholders, policy makers, target groups, 
and academic and medical advisors are brought in to develop solutions to issues at hand which 
brings about multiple interaction whereby the participants learn about their own views in relation 
to others, have the opportunity to refine those views, and, therefore, become enriched. It should 
be noted that this style of policy analysis is conducted at the very senior level within the DoD. 
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Fairness Versus Effectiveness 
The second level of analysis reflects the research study questions. Drennan (2014) 
presented an excellent analysis approach focused on the two basic elements to frame the 
arguments of those that oppose and support the integration policy. Drennan suggested that the 
proponents view the decision to allow women into combat units as a question of fairness, and 
that those who oppose the integration policy see the change leading to a degradation of military 
effectiveness. 
The proponents’ point of view and position on the decision to integrate women into direct 
ground combat units can be summarized under a fairness frame. Fairness (or neutrality) is the 
concern; therefore, complications exist because of the combat exclusion policies: The first 
argument addresses discrimination and is based on the policy itself; advocates believe that 
policies that exclude women from serving because of their gender are discriminatory and that 
such policies can ultimately hinder or otherwise harm the career opportunities of military women 
(Drennan, 2014). Discrimination by gender labels men and women by status; therefore, it 
automatically places men in a superior status and implies that women are second-class citizens 
and second-class service members. 
The second argument made by proponents addresses the need to broaden the recruiting 
and retention pool. The operational environment of modern military warfare with advanced 
weaponry and the reality of armed conflict with new enemy tactics and counterinsurgency 
operations will require the best soldier, airman, sailor, marine and leader, both men and women. 
With an emerging, new kind of enemy, it has been established that the Global War on Terror will 
be a protracted and costly fight (Record, 2003). The American Military will consistently be 
called upon to protect its self-interests, its borders, and the citizens of the United States. The 
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American Military currently is comprised of a force that is 86 percent male and 14 percent 
female (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2013); by allowing the 14 percent of the population to 
contribute and have the same opportunity as the 86 percent, the United States will be drawing 
upon 100 percent of its resources and completely seeking out the best available people. 
Subsequent to this “fairness” argument exists the belief that of the current 14 percent, many of 
them will now have the opportunity to not only make it to the flag officer (General) ranks, but 
command a division, corps or army, a position that can never be held by any officer other than 
one from combat arms organizations. I mention commanding an army in this model because U.S. 
Army generals predominately command units such as the U.S. Central Command, which 
coordinates the military’s operations worldwide and is the commander of the American Military 
in any combat contingency operation. 
A third argument for allowing women in direct combat units is that full integration will 
ultimately “level the playing field” and, thereby, mitigate the existing problem of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault as it has done in all three countries examined in this study. 
Following the announcement to rescind the Combat Exclusion Policy (DoD, 1994), this position 
was made clear in a statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2013, as cited in 
DoD Memos, 2013b) in a press conference: 
We’ve had this ongoing issue with sexual harassment, sexual assault. I believe it’s 
because we’ve had separate classes of military personnel. At some level….when you 
have one part of the population that is designated as warriors and another part that is 
designated as something else, I think that disparity begins to establish a psychology that 
in some cases led to that environment. I have to believe, the more we can treat people 
equally, the more they are likely to treat each other equally. (n.p.) 
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However, the opponents of gender integration focus on two perceived problems: the first 
perceived problem is the long-standing usual arguments of unit cohesion and the second 
perceived problem is the physical standards—both of which opponents contended will reduce 
combat effectiveness, unlike proponents who tend to base their arguments on values, fairness, 
social norms, and equality principles. Therefore, the major differences between the two are that 
the former is based on abstract principles and the latter is based on practical issues; nevertheless, 
both sides rely on practical necessities and political beliefs to support their arguments. 
The second perceived problem expressed by opponents is that full integration will lead to 
lowering entrance and sustainment standards within combat units, making them “gender-
normed” standards and thus reducing the unit’s combat effectiveness. Opponents believe that it 
would be unjust to allow women in combat and to place them in a situation in which they would 
be completely unable to take care of themselves, or if need be, to care for another service 
member, which would reduce both members’ chances of survival in a combat situation. 
Opponents view the Combat Exclusion Policy (DoD, 1994) not as discriminate legislation, but as 
a means to protect the service members, and to ensure that the United States has the most 
powerful and reliable fighting force possible. However, if the forces were not to use the 
remaining 14 percent of service members who are women, that goal would be contradictory, for 
the excluded women might be a powerful and reliable entity in the American Military’s combat 
formations. 
Findings and Conclusions 
In this study, I compared and contrasted the current American policy divergent to three 
other countries’ policies that have successfully integrated women into combat: Norway, Canada, 
and Israel. Through this examination, I revealed an opportunity to recognize gaps in training and 
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procedural information that are most important to the successful implementation in the United 
States. In addition, I examined the factors in the current American policy that might have been 
overlooked regarding indicators for a successful model. Four questions guided the focus of the 
study: 
1. What are the current organizational conditions that restrict women’s advancement in 
the American Military? 
2. How does the American gender integration policy compare and contrast with the 
gender integration policies of the three other developed countries of Norway, Canada, 
and Israel? 
3. What are the gaps in training and procedural information that are most important to 
the successful implementation in the United States? 
4. What are the beliefs and assumptions held by political advisors, policy makers, and 
stakeholders about the challenges and opportunities arising from women formally 
joining combat units? 
Despite the recent changes implemented to increase the number and types of positions 
open to women in the American Military, gender restrictions continue to affect the types of 
positions they can fill. The MDLC (2011) stated that the DoD and military service exclusionary 
policies regarding the assignment of women are institutional barriers to women’s career 
advancement and to greater gender diversity among senior military leaders. The diversity 
commission recommended eliminating these policies. To accomplish this assessment, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness initiated the Women in the Services Review, 
comprising a senior leader steering committee and a working group with representatives from the 
Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. 
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1. What are the current organizational conditions that restrict women’s advancement in 
the American Military? 
The MLDC (2011) measured the consequence of gender restrictions on women’s career 
opportunities in the American Military and progression to leadership positions. The diversity 
commission’s analyses found that women were not fully represented at both the senior NCO and 
general officer levels and had significantly lower retention rates relative to their male 
counterparts (MLDC, 2011). The commission reasoned the combat exclusion policies to be a 
significant structural barrier to the inclusion and advancement of women in the American 
Military. Clearly, the MDLC (2011) found that 
these policies work at two levels. First, they explicitly prohibit women from serving in 
certain tactical/operational career fields, such as infantry in the Army. Second, within the 
career fields that are open to women, the policies may prevent women from getting key 
assignments because they prohibit women from being assigned to units that are likely to 
be involved in direct offensive ground combat. (p. 66) 
The greatest number of positions closed to American Military women is in the U.S. 
Army, which happens to be the largest branch of the American Military. Most closed positions 
are located in occupations that are closed to women, primarily in the infantry branch, but also in 
the armored forces, field artillery, Special Forces, and combat engineers. Positions in open 
occupations that are closed to women are typically located in ground combat units at or below 
the battalion level, which accommodates approximately 800-1000 personnel. The types of units 
that are closed are led by junior officers; therefore, women who reach the rank of major and 
higher are likely to find that the number of positions closed to them is greatly reduced. A greater 
percentage of open positions does not mean that women are equally competitive for promotion, 
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command, or key assignments, especially when command and key assignments are at the brigade 
or division level. One will conclude from the MLDC (2011) that, until women can volunteer for 
combat arms branches, they will never command a division, which subsequently excludes them 
from being a combat arms officer, combat arms is a prerequisite. 
2. How does the American gender integration policy compare and contrast with the 
gender integration policies of the three other developed countries of Norway, Canada, 
and Israel? 
This inquiry about how four developed countries are integrating women into all combat 
positions in all service branches is too broad a topic for a one-dimensional policy analysis. 
However, some findings emerged from the policy analysis that illuminate each of the three 
countries’ similarities with that of the United States regarding military employment. Some 
countries are more open to women serving in any capacity (e.g., Canada) and other countries 
have similar restrictions closely resembling those of the United States, which will be limited 
regarding serving in ground combat positions. For example, Israel allows women to volunteer 
and to integrate fully into combat units; however, if operational deployment orders are issued, it 
is highly unlikely that the women in that unit will be able to deploy with their assigned unit. 
Each military branch has different service entities that comprise the Nation’s armed forces, each 
has conducted studies, and each is in the process of opening more service areas to women or at 
least of reviewing the discussion from time to time, according to their respective laws. 
When analyzing the American Military compared to the other allied countries’ militaries 
who sought a full integration, two key themes were constant across cases: concern about unit 
cohesion and sustaining equitable physical standards. However, the research appeared to show 
that the United States’ stakeholders and policy analysts were more concerned with lowering the 
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standards, which would ultimately affect combat effectiveness, while Norway, Israel, and 
Canada were more concerned with the culture and sexual harassment. For example, after an 
extended time integrating women in combat units, Norway that found that women increase 
operational effectiveness and that no evidence exists that unit cohesion is affected by having 
women in combat units. Similarly, the CAF, which has also been fully integrated since the 
1980s, reports that no negative effect has occurred in operational performance or team cohesion 
because of the presence of women in combat units. 
In the beginning of the CAF integration, some leaders held assumptions and beliefs that 
the changes would affect combat effectiveness and questioned women’s ability to serve in a male 
“unique” culture, as occurred in the United States. Women did experience sex and gender 
stereotyping during the initial phase of CAF integration; however, the Canadian leaders have 
developed strategies to negotiate and adapt to the culture, and over the years have improved 
understanding of the cultural changes through the increased representation of women in 
leadership roles and on operational deployments. Similarly, Israeli commanders have recognized 
that women often exhibit superior skills in areas such as discipline and motivation, maintaining 
alertness, shooting abilities, managing tasks in an organized manner, and displaying knowledge 
and professionalism in the use of weapons. Despite their performance, women often face the 
same ongoing battle against skepticism and mistrust in the form of teasing from their fellow male 
combatants and negative messages from high-ranking officers. There is resistance to integrating 
women fully into small combat units, but that seems to stem from women taking over an all-male 
position within the forces (cohesion). 
Until the final policy is implemented, to what degree women will be allowed to serve in a 
combat capacity in January 2016 is yet to be determined.  To date, the U.S. Air Force is the only 
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branch of the American Military that has not submitted an exception to the policy not to allow 
women to serve in combat units—the U.S. Marines, U.S. Army, and U.S. Navy have all 
submitted the exceptions.  
3. What are the gaps in training and procedural information that are most important to 
the successful implementation in the United States? 
When considering the training and procedural gaps that might occur when implementing 
a full integration plan, one can look back to the integration of the female engagement teams 
(FETS) used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The FET is a product made out of necessity during the Iraq 
and Afghanistan Wars, and consists women soldiers specifically trained to conduct host nation 
engagement activities in a culturally respectful manner.  For example, in the Middle East, it is 
culturally offensive for a man to touch a woman who is not his wife; therefore, the FETS will 
conduct body searches on the women at checkpoints. FETS are extremely effective, especially 
when attached to Special Operation units such as the U.S. Navy SEALS and U.S. Army Special 
Forces when conducting raids. 
Some of the findings about challenges in gender integration were superstitions related to 
women in combat, for example, concerns about fraternization, misunderstandings about 
women’s health and welfare needs, and lack of experience from the men working with women. 
According to the NCOs and officers who worked, supervised, and commanded the FETS, the 
best way to meet these challenges has been to allow women to demonstrate their capabilities 
through integrated training, physical training competitions, and team building exercises. Rather 
than focusing on gender, emphasis was on the extensive training and development of the team to 
become a well-trained, motivated, and professional asset that will help the unit achieve its 
objectives during deployment. It was found that the inclusion of women engagement in 
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American Military doctrine, policy, education, and training would assist organizations at all 
levels to understand how women will enhance the organization and develop a better war-fighting 
team. A clear mission and standard procedure will enhance women’s integration and 
employment. Full integration is a critical capability that can be incorporated into future military 
operations.  
 From analyzing the beliefs of proponents for and opponents against integration, the 
analysis indicates that, if the American Military leaders truly desire for the policy to succeed, one 
will be able to justify the existence of the policy; if one detests the policy, one can also develop 
his or her own justifications for the failure of the policy. It can also be asserted that integration 
should not be achieved by framing access as an equality issue; rather it is more likely to be 
achieved by focusing on the superior capabilities that women bring to the operational success of 
the force. A conclusion of the study is that all American Military service members, male and 
female, should have the same just right to at least attempt, if they choose, to participate in 
combat and elite positions during their career to achieve their full potential. If not allowed to 
achieve a key milestone or “gate” in one’s military career, the deprivation could potentially 
cause a domino effect, forcing a service member to deprioritize the ranks and duties that he or 
she is not allowed to achieve. 
The purpose of this analysis was to compare varying policies and procedures adopted by 
other foreign militaries similar to that of the American Military so that this research could 
contribute to the discussions and analysis of the 2013 decision to integrate women into ground 
combat and elite special operations combat positions. This was accomplished through a framing 
analysis of the debate in governmental websites and organizational policies to identify arguments 
for and against in integrating women into ground combat organizations. Throughout the research, 
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the analysis identified key stakeholder groups and used a different lens or perspective to achieve 
a better understanding of the perspectives, arguments, and avenues of other nations that have 
allowed an achievable transition to a fully integrated military. With a thorough understanding of 
the stakeholders and their perspectives, one can see potential obstacles and can suggest actions to 
gain acceptance of the new policy.  
4. What are the beliefs and assumptions held by political advisors, policy makers, and 
stakeholders about the challenges and opportunities arising from women formally 
joining combat units? 
The analysis of proponent and opponent stakeholder groups shows that stakeholders, 
political advisors, and policy makers base their respective arguments for and against integrating 
women into direct ground combat on assumptions, values, social constructs, and traditional 
Judeo-Christian beliefs that women are inferior to men. The scientific data, although supporting 
the fact that physiological differences exist between men and women, did not support the 
argument that all women should be excluded from combat units. I conclude that, although two 
common themes of concern existed throughout the research across cases—unit cohesion 
degradation and inequitable physical standards—the three countries examined reported that no 
effect occurred on unit morale or cohesion, and that it did not matter whether physical standards 
were general neutral or gender-normed: All three countries reported that a very small number of 
women volunteered for the combat organizations, which is on a par with the numbers who 
volunteered for the U.S. Army Ranger Course. Nevertheless, in those small percentages in all 
three countries, women are performing equally as well as men, and in some specific areas, they 
perform even better. More importantly, Norway and Canada found that integrating women into 
the combat organizations is a leadership issue and not a social, sexual, or culture issue. They 
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found that educating leaders on professionalism and equality creates a successful organization. 
Surprisingly, sexual harassment decreased in Norway, which is the only country that is known to 
implement cohabitation in one of their organizations, housing two women and four men in a 
single room. 
Recommendation for Leaders 
How is it that the American Military can be a pioneer in scientific research, technological 
advances, racial integration, religious freedom, and the inclusion of gays and lesbians, but at the 
same time, be so overwhelmed with the “problematic” issue of allowing a service member to 
become a combat arms specialist? After all, the American Military discovered Kevlar, first used 
the Internet in the 1960s, commissioned the first Buddhist chaplain in 2008, now allows gays and 
lesbians to serve freely, and now acknowledges gay marriage with the same benefits as 
“traditional” marriages. 
The answer to the puzzle is that it is somewhat problematic for the leaders on the ground 
who will execute the policy, but it is more problematic for the politicians and senior military 
officials who fail to recognize (a) the great contribution women have made, (b) the future 
contributions that they will make as the other of the two sexes, and (c) that they are just as 
courageous as men are. The mid-level leader on the ground will have fewer problems because 
women’s service in the American Military will be viewed as a leadership opportunity, instead of 
a leadership challenge or concern. The field grade officers, sergeants major, command sergeants 
major, master gunnery sergeants, chief master sergeants, and master chief petty officers will 
execute this policy without hesitation and will learn from other countries’ similar experiences for 
more than 20 years. From the beginning of the CAF integration, the assumptions and beliefs 
were the same as in the American Military: that integrating women into direct combat units 
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would affect combat effectiveness, degrade unit cohesion, and questioned women’s ability to 
serve in a male “unique” culture. However, although the women in the CAF did experience sex 
and gender stereotyping, they also developed strategies to negotiate and adapt to the culture and, 
over the years, have improved its understanding of the cultural changes through the increased 
representation of women in leadership roles and on operational deployments (Cawkill et al., 
2009). The Army Lessons Learned Center (1998, as cited in Cawkill et al., 2009) stated: 
Cohesion of mixed gender combat arms units was a leadership challenge. In a 
nonhomogeneous environment, there needed to be a search for common ground or a point 
on which all team members could identify, and it was considered a leadership 
responsibility to provide the framework and common ground to facilitate team building. 
(p. 18) 
Therefore, the recommendation of current leaders and future leaders is to evaluate one’s units 
constantly, to educate oneself continually, and to treat everyone equally in an organization that 
promotes equality and diversity. 
Questions for Further Research 
The decision to rescind the Combat Exclusion Policy (DoD, 1994) was a groundbreaking 
one by Secretary of Defense Panetta in January 2013 for all the proponents who have fought for 
over 2 decades to ensure that women were given the parity with men. The American Military 
woman has fought with honor and distinction since World War II and, following the 1990 
Persian Gulf War, women were deploying at a rate never seen before in history. The 
overwhelming success of women’s performance was once again elevated during the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars over the last 15 years and definitely fueled the debate once again about the 
barriers that were placed in front of women in the American Military. 
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Through the course of this study, it has been evident that the subject of integrating 
women into direct ground combat arms organizations is a sensitive issue and a very broad topic. 
In this study, I explored the debate by analyzing the integration policies and processes of three 
other developed countries with the intent of gaining a better understanding of the values, issues, 
and assumptions held so that I could expand the understanding and knowledge about these 
concerns for the American stakeholder. A tremendous opportunity remains for the United States 
to fully embrace the 2016 integration policy and to continue to be a learning organization by 
continually improving the policy. For this to occur, further research must be conducted within 
the next 5–10 years; and the researchers should answer one important question: After the 
rescinding of the ground Combat Exclusion Policy (DoD, 1994), will allowing women in full 
combat roles assist them in achieving full career potential after the January 2016 
implementation? 
In this study, I explored, examined, and analyzed the ongoing debate surrounding the 
integration of women into direct ground combat units as viewed through broadcasting, books, 
and online media. In my research, I identified the key stakeholder groups, the arguments 
presented for and against by each side in the debate, how each side frames the debate, and how 
these frames are constructed from underlying assumptions and values. Most importantly, in the 
study, I examined the successful integration of women into the military services of three other 
developed countries, with similar concerns and arguments pre-integration. In so doing, I hope 
that the readers can better understand the debate, the possible implications of change, and areas 
for future study as the American Military moves forward with gender integration. 
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